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COURT GROWS CRITICAL WHEN RACE, LAW INTERSECT
The Majority Now Rejecting Bias Remedies
USA Today
Copyright 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
Tony Mauro; Tom Watson
For the third time this month, the Supreme Court
on Thursday said it was tired. Tired, that is, of the
traditional approaches to remedying the national
problem of race discrimination.
On June 12, the court's conservative majority
voiced dissatisfaction with affirmative action and
school desegregation. On Thursday, it was race-based
redistricting that got the court upset.
Using race as the primary reason for creating a
district, to enhance chances of electing a minority
candidate, violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal treatment of all races under the law, the court
said.
That pronouncement, which throws hundreds of
congressional, state and local districts nationwide into
turmoil, must have given pause to retired Justice
Hany Blackmun, who was in the courtroom Thursday
to hear it.
It was 17 years ago that Blackmun penned the
simple formulation that describes the underlying
theory of the approach to civil rights that the current
court is repudiating. "In order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race," Blackmun wrote.
Under that banner, the court embraced affirmative
action, which takes race into account by giving
minorities preferences in contracts and employment. It
endorsed special measures for minority students in
schools and it encouraged remedies under the Voting
Rights Act aimed at boosting the voting power of
minorities.
But now, riding the same wave that brought the
Republican majority to Congress last fall, the court
seems to be saying that racial preferences are an idea
whose time has passed.
In Baton Rouge, La., one of the areas affected by
Thursday's ruling, opinion seems as divided as it is
within the court.
AJ. Lord, owner of A.J.'s Restaurant, agrees it is
important to have minorities in Congress. But he also
believes other things are just as important, such as
having members of Congress represent cohesive
districts.
Louisiana's 4th District was drawn to create a
majority-minority district, but it is so far-flung, says
Lord, that many voters don't know who their
congressman is.
"At some point, you have to weigh your
objectives to elect black candidates to office, or have
proper representation of a district," says Lord. "It's a
balancing act and there's no easy solution."
Frank Ransburg, a political scientist at Southern
University, a historically black school in north Baton
Rouge, says abolishing the district now represented by
Rep. Cleo Fields, who is black, would reverse
important civil rights gains.
"There are some people in the state who don't feel
that blacks should be allowed to fully participate in
the political process," Ransburg says.
Most liberals say the court is too hasty in
declaring the problem of racial bias solved, and that
race-conscious remedies are no longer needed.
"The three decisions reflect unfortunate judicial
resistance to reasonable efforts toward racial
inclusiveness," says Harvard law professor Laurence
Tribe. "The combined effect is to turn the clock back
on an effort that is not yet completed."
The Rev. Jesse Jackson: "The court has
authorized the country to unravel the legal fabric of
social justice and inclusion that has been woven
together over the last 41 years."
Jackson has special words of contempt for Justice
Clarence Thomas, the court's only black justice, who
was part of the 5-4 majority in all three cases. "It is
especially painful that a descendant of slaves, in
effect, stabbed Dr. (Martin Luther) King. . . in the
back, and is paving the way back toward slavery,"
Jackson says.
The idea of drawing districts to pull in pockets of
minority voters developed in the last two decades in
response to a political truth: Black candidates are
rarely elected in districts where whites form the
majority of the population.
"There are thousands of redistricting plans in the
South and throughout the country in which racial
fairness was taken into account," says Lauglin
McDonald of the American Civil Liberties Union.
"All of these plans are presumed to be unlawful."
Others in the civil rights movement are more
optimistic, especially after the court announced later
Thursday that it would take up two new redistricting
cases in the fall on related issues of race.
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"They've muddied the waters, but they haven't yet
turned 180 degrees," says Elaine Jones of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund. "The issue has
just begun."
Clinton administration civil rights chief Deval
Patrick, whose department reviews redistricting plans
under the Voting Rights Act, says, "It would be a
tragedy if these decisions led to the resegregation of
American democracy."
Other racially drawn districts may be challenged
The Supreme Court's ruling Thursday against a
black-majority congressional district in Georgia is
expected to prompt court challenges to similar racially
drawn districts across the USA. Opponents say the
districts, often oddly shaped, reduce the power of
white voters. Georgia's 11th District and Louisiana's
4th District were both challenged in cases that went to
the high court, but justices did not rule on the
Louisiana case because the plaintiffs no longer live in
the district. Also Thursday, the court agreed to hear
arguments against three minority-majority districts in
Texas and to rehear arguments against the black
majority 12th District in North Carolina. All of the
districts were created after the 1990 Census to comply
with the federal Voting Rights Act's mandate to
increase minority political representation.
Georgia's I Ith District
11th District Blacks64% Whites34% Other 2%
Georgia Blacks27% Whites7l% Other 2%
Louisiana's 4th District
4th District Blacks58% Whites4l% Other 1%
Louisiana Blacks3 1% Whites67% Other 2%
North Carolina's 12th District
12th District Blacks57% Whites42% Other 1%
North Carolina Blacks22% Whites76% Other 2%
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JUSTICES STEP OUT OF CHARACTER TO SEIZE BROAD ISSUES
The Baltimore Sun
Copyright 1995 The Baltimore Sun Company
Wednesday, June 14, 1995
Lyle Denniston
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington - The Supreme Court, having built
a reputation in recent years for cautious and modest
use of its power, showed its other side this week by
reaching out on a grand scale to answer questions
about race relations that it could have avoided.
In two of the most important decisions in years on
racial equality, a five-justice conservative majority on
Monday appeared to go out of its way to declare new
constitutional law.
More broadly than it had been asked, the court
acted against affirmative action in federal programs
and against ambitious school desegregation orders by
federal judges.
By 5-4 votes in a Colorado affirmative action
case and a Kansas City, Mo., desegregation case, the
court put aside its self-imposed rule that when the
Constitution is involved, decisions should be drawn as
narrowly as possible.
The court was not asked to address a 1990
Supreme Court ruling that had made it easier for
Congress and federal agencies to set up programs with
race preferences. The court nevertheless struck down
that ruling, dismissing it as a "surprising" break in a
long string of decisions against government's use of
race as a deciding factor in policy.
The court had before it only a small federal
program that used race not as an automatic basis for
awarding government benefits, but only as a partial
factor. Yet the majority chose to canvass the history of
race relations back to World War II as a premise for
striking out against decades of federal affirmative
action.
On school desegregation, the court decided a
question it had refused to decide six years ago in an
earlier phase of the Kansas City case - a question
neither side formally raised in the new appeal.
Still, in its ruling, the court itself answered that
very question: Does a federal judge who is overseeing
desegregation of inner-city schools act illegally by
ordering a high-cost and upscale "quality education"
program in the city to entice white students to come in
from the suburbs?
Yes, the court said bluntly and firmly: The judge,
acting on desegregation in the city, must order changes
affecting only city schools and their students.
Stoutly defending the court's authority to answer
that question was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
in January had chided the school district's lawyer for
bringing it up.
Analysts suggested yesterday that the court had
opted to speak broadly to send clearer messages on the
law of race relations.
One such analyst is Richard A. Samp, chief
counsel of a conservative legal advocacy group, the
Washington Legal Foundation. He successfully
challenged the constitutionality of the scholarships for
black students at the University of Maryland at
College Park - a program that, in lower courts, failed
exactly the same test that the Supreme Court laid
down this week for federal affirmative action plans.
In the school case decided this week, Mr. Samp
said, the court clearly spoke beyond the issues put to
it. That was also true, he noted, in the affirmative
action case.
"No one thought it was necessary [to overrule the
1990 decision] to decide this case," he said. The
majority "realized the votes were there to get rid of a
decision four members of the court had never
accepted."
He recalled that Justice O'Connor, author of the
new ruling, also had written a decision in 1989 that
had gone far toward scuttling state and local
affirmative action plans.
Yet since then, similar programs at the federal
level had been surviving challenges, largely because
of the court's contradictory ruling in 1990 in favor of
federal versions of affirmative action.
"Justice O'Connor seemed to be frustrated that
[the 1989 ruling] had not made much difference," Mr.
Samp said.
Her new opinion did not say flatly that no official
plan to benefit citizens based on race could survive.
But it said the strictest constitutional test must be
applied to all official uses of race as a deciding factor
in public policy and benefits.
Civil rights and women's rights groups and liberal
commentators seized on one portion of Justice
O'Connor's decision to argue that the court had not
meant to scuttle affirmative action, and in fact had left
a large loophole that lower courts could use to uphold
such plans.
But the O'Connor opinion used the only test the
court had within reach to curb affirmative action
significantly and make the point that race is a
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suspicious basis for official action. It was not unusual
for the court to acknowledge that some programs
might satisfy that test; the court never decides a
dispute not before it.
What stood out as the "bottom line" of the
O'Connor opinion, for Edward W. Warren, a
Washington lawyer, was the emphasis the court put on
individual rights, not "group rights," when race was
the basis for government action. Mr. Warren himself
now awaits a ruling from the court on a race-based
congressional redistricting case he argued.
He said that civil rights groups' "rosy view" of the
case "is hard to square" with the court's declarations
that individuals of all races must be treated equally
under the Constitution.
Moreover, Mr. Warren said, the test the court
imposed for affirmative action "is a very difficult test
to meet." While one can imagine programs that could
pass that test, he said, anyone who defends racial
preferences will have to offer "very substantial,
particularized proof' that those who would receive the
preference must have it to overcome continuing
difficulties traceable to past racial bias.
"I have never seen quite as clear a rejection of
'group rights,' " Mr. Warren said.
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THE SUPREME COURT
Excerpts From High Court Ruling in Racial Districting Case
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
Friday, June 30, 1995
Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court
decision in Miller v. Johnson, holding that the use of
race as a "predominant factor" in drawing electoral
district lines is presumably unconstitutional. The vote
was 5 to 4. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion, which Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, Stephen G.
Breyer and David H. Souter dissented. Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens filed dissenting opinions.
FROM THE DECISION
By Justice Kennedy
The constitutionality of Georgia's Congressional
redistricting plan is at issue here. In Shaw v. Reno, we
held that a plaintiff states a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause by alleging that a state redistricting
plan, on its face, has no rational explanation save as
an effort to separate voters on the basis of race. The
question we now decide is whether Georgia's new
11th District gives rise to a valid equal protection
claim under the principles announced in Shaw and, if
so, whether it can be sustained nonetheless as
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest ....
In 1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia
a covered jurisdiction under Sec. 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act. . . . In consequence, Sec. 5 of the act
requires Georgia to obtain either administrative
preclearance by the Attorney General or approval by
the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia of any change in a "standard, practice or
procdure VV eLspect to VoLLg mnade afr NoV. 1,
1964. The preclearance mechanism applies to
Congressional redistricting plans, and requires that the
proposed change "not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color." . . .
Between 1980 and 1990, one of Georgia's 10
Congressional districts was a majority-black district
- that is, a majority of the district's voters were black.
The 1990 decennial census indicated that Georgia's
population of 6,478,216 persons, 27 percent of whom
are black, entitled it to an additional 11th
Congressional seat, App. 9, prompting Georgia's
General Assembly to redraw the State's Congressional
districts.....
Elections were held under the new Congressional
redistricting plan on Nov. 4, 1992, and black
candidates were elected to Congress from all three
majority-black districts. On Jan. 13, 1994, appellees,
five white voters from the 11th District, filed this
action against various state officials (Miller
Appellants) in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia. ...
Finding that the "evidence of the General
Assembly's intent to racially gerrymander the 11th
District is overwhelming, and practically stipulated by
the parties involved," the District Court held that race
was the predominant, overriding factor in drawing the
11th District. Appellants do not take issue with the
court's factual finding of this racial motivation.
Rather, they contend that evidence of a Legislature's
deliberate classification of voters on the basis of race
cannot alone suffice to state a claim under Shaw.
They argue that, regardless of the Legislature's
purposes, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a district's
shape is so bizarre that it is unexplainable other than
on the basis of race, and that appellees failed to make
that showing here. Appellants' conception of the
constitutional violation misapprehends our holding in
Shaw and the equal protection precedent upon which
Shaw relied.
Shaw recognized a claim "analytically distinct"
from a vote dilution claim. Whereas a vote dilution
claim alleges that the State has enacted a particular
voting scheme as a purposeful device "to minimize or
cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities," Mobile v. Bolden (1980), an action
disadvantaging voters of a particular race, the essence
of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is
that the State has used race as a basis for separating
voters into districts.
Ju asU1 thUSaLe may not, ausent extraordinary
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in
its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches and
schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not
separate its citizens into different voting districts on
the basis of race. The idea is a simple one: "At the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not 'as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class.' " . .
When the State assigns voters on the basis of
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of
their race, "think alike, share the same political
interests and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls." Shaw. Race-based assignments "embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of
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their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts and
their very worth as citizens according to a criterion
barred to the Government by history and the
Constitution." . . . They also cause society serious
harm. As we concluded in Shaw:
"Racial classifications with respect to voting carry
particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for
remedial purposes, may Balkanize us into competing
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters -- a goal that the 14th and 15th Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.
It is for these reasons that race-based districting by
our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny."
Our observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial
stereotyping was not meant to suggest that a district
must be bizarre on its face before there is a
constitutional violation. Nor was our conclusion in
Shaw that in certain instances a district's appearance
(or, to be more precise, its appearance in combination
with certain demographic evidence) can give rise to an
equal protection claim, a holding that bizarreness was
a threshold showing, as appellants believe it to be.
Our circumspect approach and narrow holding in
Shaw did not erect an artificial rule barring accepted
equal protection analysis in other redistricting cases.
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a
necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a
threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be
persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its
own sake, and not other districting principles, was.the
Legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in
drawing its district lines. The logical implication, as
courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that parties
may rely on evidence other than bizarreness to
establish race-based districting.
Our reasoning in Shaw compels this conclusion.
We recognized in Shaw that, outside the districting
context, statutes are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain
express racial classifications, but also when, though
race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a
racial purpose or object. ...
Shaw applied these same principles to
redistricting. "In some exceptional cases, a
reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that,
on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to 'segregat(e) . .. voters'
on the basis of race." In other cases, where the district
is not so bizarre on its face that it discloses a racial
design, the proof will be more "difficul(t)." Although
it was not necessary in Shaw to consider further the
proof required in these more difficult cases, the logical
import of our reasoning is that evidence other than a
district's bizarre shape can be used to support the
claim.
Appellants and some of their amici argue that the
Equal Protection Clause's general proscription on
race-based decision making does not obtain in the
districting context because redistricting by definition
involves racial considerations. Underlying their
argument are the very stereotypical assumptions the
Equal Protection Clause forbids.
It is true that redistricting in most cases will
implicate a political calculus in which various
interests compete for recognition, but it does not
follow from this that individuals of the same race
share a single political interest. The view that they do
is "based on the demeaning notion that members of
the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority
views' that must be different from those of other
citizens," the precise use of race as a proxy the
Constitution prohibits....
In sum, we make clear that parties alleging that a
State has assigned voters on the basis of race are
neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding
the district's geometry and makeup nor required to
make a threshold showing of bizarreness. Today's case
requires us further to consider the requirements of the
proof necessary to sustain this equal protection
challenge....
In our view, the District Court applied the correct
analysis, and its finding that race was the predominant
factor motivating the drawing of the 11th District was
not clearly erroneous. The court found it was
"exceedingly obvious" from the shape of the 11th
District, together with the relevant racial
demographics, that the drawing of narrow land
bridges to incorporate within the district outlying
appendages containing nearly 80 percent of the
district's total black population was a deliberate
attempt to bring black populations into the district.
Although by comparison with other districts the
geometric shape of the 11th District may not seem
bizarre on its face, when its shape is considered in
conjunction with its racial and population densities,
the story of racial gerrymandering seen by the District
Court becomes much clearer....
As a result, Georgia's Congressional redistricting
plan cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny,
our most rigorous and exacting standard of
constitutional review....
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must
demonstrate that its districting legislation is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest. There is a
"significant state interest in eradicating the effects of
past racial discrimination." The State does not argue,
however, that it created the 11th District to remedy
past discrimination, and with good reason: there is
little doubt that the State's true interest in designing
the 11th District was creating a third majority-black
district to satisfy the Justice Department's preclearance
demands....
Whether or not in some cases compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a
compelling interest independent of any interest in
remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here.
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As we suggested in Shaw, compliance with Federal
antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based
districting where the challenged district was not
reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading
and application of those laws. The congressional plan
challenged here was not required by the Voting Rights
Act under a correct reading of the statute....
We think it inappropriate for a court engaged in
constitutional scrutiny to accord deference to the
Justice Department's interpretation of the act.
Although we have deferred to the department's
interpretation in certain statutory cases, we have
rejected agency interpretations to which we would
otherwise defer where they raise serious constitutional
questions. When the Justice Department's
interpretation of the act compels race-based
districting, it by definition raises a serious
constitutional question ... and should not receive
deference.
The Voting Rights Act and its grant of authority
to the Federal courts to uncover official efforts to
abridge minorities' right to vote have been of vital
importance in eradicating invidious discrimination
from the electoral process and enhancing the
legitimacy of our political institutions. Only if our
political system and our society cleanse themselves of
that discrimination will all members of the polity
share an equal opportunity to gain public office
regardless of race.
As a Nation, we share both the obligation and the
aspiration of working toward this end. The end is
neither assured nor well served, however, by carving
electorates into racial blocs. "If our society is to
continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it
must recognize that the automatic invocation of race
stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued
hurt and injury."
It takes a shortsighted and unauthorized view of
the Voting Rights Act to invoke that statute, which
has played a decisive role in redressing some of our
worst forms of discrimination, to demand the very
racial stereotyping the 14th Amendment forbids.
BY JUSTICE O'CONNOR, Concurring
I understand the threshold standard the Court
adopts "that the Legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles . . to racial
considerations" to be a demanding one. To invoke
strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has
relied on race in substantial disregard of customary
and traditional districting practices. Those practices
provide a crucial frame of reference and therefore
constitute a significant governing principle in cases of
this kind.
The standard would be no different if a
Legislature had drawn the boundaries to favor some
other ethnic group; certainly, the standard does not
treat efforts to create majority-minority districts less
favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other
groups. Indeed, the driving force behind the adoption
of the 14th Amendment was the desire to end legal
discrimination against blacks.
Application of the Court's standard does not
throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435
Congressional districts, where presumably the States
have drawn the boundaries in accordance with their
customary districting principles. That is so even
though race may well have been considered in the
redistricting process. But application of the Court's
standard helps achieve Shaw's basic objective of
making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject
to meaningful judicial review.
I therefore join the Court's opinion.
FROM THE DISSENT By Justice Ginsburg
Two terms ago, in Shaw v. Reno, this Court took
up a claim "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution
claim. Shaw authorized judicial intervention in
"extremely irregular" apportionments, in which the
Legislature cast aside traditional districting practices
to consider race alone in the Shaw case, to create a
district in North Carolina in which African-Americans
would compose a majority of the voters.
Today the Court expands the judicial role,
announcing that Federal courts are to undertake a
searching review of any district with contours
"predominantly motivated" by race: "strict scrutiny"
will be triggered not only when traditional districting
practices are abandoned, but also when those practices
are "subordinated to" and given less weight than race.
Applying this new "race-as-predominant-factor"
standard, the Court invalidates Georgia's districting
plan even though Georgia's 11th District, the focus of
today's dispute, bears the imprint of familiar
districting practices. Because I do not endorse the
Court's new standard and would not upset Georgia's
plan, I dissent....
Before Shaw v. Reno, this Court invoked the
Equal Protection Clause to justify intervention in the
quintessentially political task of legislative districting
in two circumstances: to enforce the one
person-one-vote requirement and to prevent dilution
of a minority group's voting strength.
In Shaw, the Court recognized a third basis for an
equal protection challenge to a State's apportionment
plan. The Court wrote cautiously, emphasizing thatjudicial intervention is exceptional: "(S)trict (judicial)
scrutiny" is in order, the Court declared, if a district is
0so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can
be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting." , .
The problem in Shaw was not the plan architects'
consideration of race as relevant in redistricting.
117
Rather, in the Court's estimation, it was the virtual
exclusion of other factors from the calculus.....
The record before us does not show that race
similarly overwhelmed traditional districting practices
in Georgia....
In contrast to the snake-like North Carolina
district inspected in Shaw, Georgia's 1 Ith District is
hardly "bizarre," "extremely irregular" or "irrational
on its face." Instead, the 11th District's design reflects
significant consideration of "traditional districting
factors (such as keeping political subdivisions intact)
and the usual political process of compromise and
trades for a variety of nonracial reasons." . . .
Along with attention to size, shape, and political
subdivisions, the Court recognizes as an appropriate
districting principle "respect for . . . communities
defined by actual shared interests." The Court finds no
community here, however, because a report in the
record showed "fractured political, social and
economic interests within the 11th District's black
population."
But ethnicity itself can tie people together, as
volumes of social science literature have documented
even people with divergent economic interests. For
this reason, ethnicity is a significant force in political
life....
To accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds,
legislatures have long drawn voting districts along
ethnic lines. Our Nation's cities are full of districts
identified by their ethnic character as Chinese, Irish,
Italian, Jewish, Polish, Russian, for example....
To separate permissible and impermissible use of
race in legislative apportionment, the Court orders
strict scrutiny for districting plans "predominantly
motivated" by race. -No longer can a State avoid
judicial oversight by giving, as in this case, genuine
and measurable consideration to traditional districting
practices. Instead, a Federal case can be mounted
whenever plaintiffs plausibly allege that other factors
carried less weight than race. This invitation to litigate
against the State seems to me neither necessary nor
proper....
The Court derives its test from diverse opinions
on the relevance of race in contexts distinctly unlike
apportionment. The controlling idea, the Court says,
is "the simple command (at the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection) that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class." ...
In adopting districting plans, however, States do
not treat people as individuals. Apportionment
schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in
groups...
That ethnicity defines some of these groups is a
political reality. Until now, no constitutional infirmity
has been seen in districting Irish or Italian voters
together, for example, so long as the delineation does
not abandon familiar apportionment practices.
If Chinese-Americans and Russian-Americans
may seek and secure group recognition in the
delineation of voting districts, then African-Americans
should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in the
name of equal protection, we would shut out "the very
minority group whose history in the United States
gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause." . . .
Under the Court's approach, judicial review of the
same intensity, i.e., strict scrutiny, is in order once it
is determined that an apportionment is predominantly
motivated by race. It matters not at all, in this new
regime, whether the apportionment dilutes or enhances
minority voting strength. .
Special circumstances justify vigilant judicial
inspection to protect minority voters, circumstances
that do not apply to majority voters. A history of
exclusion from state politics left racial minorities
without clout to extract provisions for fair
representation in the law-making forum. The equal
protection rights of minority voters thus could have
remained unrealized absent the Judiciary's close
surveillance....
The majority, by definition, encounters no such
blockage. White voters in Georgia do not lack means
to exert strong pressure on their state legislators....
The Court's disposition renders redistricting
perilous work for state legislatures. Statutory
mandates and political realities may require States to
consider race when drawing district lines. But today's
decision is a counterforce; it opens the way for Federal
litigation if "traditional . . . districting principles"
arguably were accorded less weight than race...
This enlargement of the judicial role is
unwarranted. The reapportionment plan that resulted
from Georgia's political process merited this Court's
approbation, not its condemnation. Accordingly, I
dissent.
BY JUSTICE STEVENS, Dissenting
I believe the respondents in these cases, like the
respondents in United States v. Hays, have not
suffered any legally cognizable injury. . . .
Respondents, plaintiffs below, are white voters in
Georgia's 11th Congressional District. The Court's
conclusion that they have standing to maintain a Shaw
claim appears to rest on a theory that their placement
in the 11th District caused them "representational
harms."
The Shaw Court explained the concept of
"representational harms" as follows: "When a district
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation
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is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole." . . .
Respondents' standing, in other words, ultimately
depends on the very premise the Court purports to
abhor: that voters of a particular race "think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls." This generalization, as
the Court recognizes, is "offensive and
demeaning.". .
In particular instances, of course, members of one
race may vote by an overwhelming margin for one
candidate, and in some cases that candidate will be of
the same race. "Racially polarized voting" is one of
the circumstances plaintiffs must prove to advance a
vote dilution claim.... Such a claim allows voters to
allege that gerrymandered district lines have impaired
their ability to elect a candidate of their own race. The
Court emphasizes, however, that a so-called Shaw
claim is "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution
claim....
Neither in Shaw nor in Hays nor in the instant
cases has the Court answered the question its analytic
distinction raises: If the Shaw injury does not flow
from an increased probability that white candidates
will lose, then how can the increased probability that
black candidates will win cause white voters, such as
respondents, cognizable harm?
The Court's equation of Shaw claims with our
desegregation decisions is inappropriate for another
reason. In each of those cases, legal segregation
frustrated the public interest in diversity and tolerance
by barring African-Americans from joining whites in
the activities at issue. The districting plan here, in
contrast, serves the interest in diversity and tolerance
by increasing the likelihood that a meaningful number
of black representatives will add their voices to
legislative debates. . . . That racial integration of the
sort attempted by Georgia now appears more
vulnerable to judicial challenge than some policies
alleged to perpetuate racial bias . .. is anomalous, to
say the least.
Equally distressing is the Court's equation of
traditional gerrymanders, designed to maintain or
enhance a dominant group's power, with a dominant
group's decision to share its power with a previously
underrepresented group. In my view, districting plans
violate the Equal Protection Clause when they "serve
no purpose other than to favor one segment, whether
racial, ethnic, religious, economic or political, that
may occupy a position of strength at a particular point
in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment
of the community."
I do not see how a districting plan that favors a
politically weak group can violate equal protection.
The Constitution does not mandate any form of
proportional representation, but it certainly permits a
State to adopt a policy that promotes fair
representation of different groups.
The Court's refusal to distinguish an enactment
that helps a minority group from enactments that
cause it harm is especially unfortunate at the
intersection of race and voting, given that
African-Americans and other disadvantaged groups
have struggled so long and so hard for inclusion in
that most central exercise of our democracy.
I have long believed that treating racial groups
differently from other identifiable groups of voters, as
the Court does today, is itself an invidious racial
classification. Racial minorities should receive neither
more nor less protection than other groups against
gerrymanders. A fortiori, racial minorities should not
be less eligible than other groups to benefit from
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Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court
decision today in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
holding that affirmative action programs must be
subject to the most searching constitutional scrutiny.
The vote was 5 to 4. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
joined. Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote concurring
opinions as well. Justices John Paul Stevens, David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer dissented. All except Justice Breyer filed
dissenting opinions.
FROM THE DECISION By Justice O'Connor
Petitioner Adarand Constructors Inc. claims that
the Federal Government's practice of giving general
contractors on Government projects a financial
incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by "socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals," and in
particular, the Government's use of race-based
presumptions in identifying such individuals, violates
the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of
Appeals rejected Adarand's claim. We conclude,
however, that courts should analyze cases of this kind
under a different standard of review than the one the
Court of Appeals applied. We therefore vacate the
Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings....
The contract giving rise to the dispute in this case
came about as a result of the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, a
D.O.I. appropiaions imeasure. Section 1I6(c)(1) UL
Sturaa provides that "not less than 10 percent" of the
appropriated funds "shall be expended with
small-business concerns owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."
STURAA adopts the Small Business Act's definition
of "socially and economically disadvantaged
individual," including the applicable race-based
presumptions, and adds that "women shall be
presumed to be socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals for purposes of this
subsection." STURAA also requires the Secretary of
Transportation to establish "minimum uniform criteria
for state governments to use in certifying whether a
concern qualifies for purposes of this subsection." The
Secretary has done so in 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D
(1994). Those regulations say that the certifying
authority should presume both social and economic
disadvantage (i.e., eligibility to participate) if the
applicant belongs to certain racial groups, or is a
woman....
Adarand's claim arises under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
"No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law." Although this
Court has always understood that clause to provide
some measure of protection against arbitrary treatment
by the Federal Government, it is not as explicit a
guarantee of equal treatment as the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that "No state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws" (emphasis added). Our cases
have accorded varying degrees of significance to the
difference in the language of those two clauses. We
think it necessary to revisit the issue here....
The Court's failure to produce a majority opinion
in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California
1978, Fullilove v. Klutznick 1980, and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education 1986 left unresolved the
proper analysis for remedial race-based governmental
action....
The Court resolved the issue, at least in part, in
1989. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. concerned a
city's determination that 30 percent of its contracting
work should go to minority-owned businesses. A
majority of the Court in Croson held that "the standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification" and that the single
standard of review for racial classifications should be
"strict scrutiny." . . .
With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all
race-based action by state and local governments. But
Croson of course had no occasion to declare what
standard of review the Fifth Amendment requires for
such action taken by the Federal Government. Croson
observed simply that the Court's "treatment of an
exercise of Congressional power in Fullilove cannot
be dispositive here," because Croson's facts did not
implicate Congress's broad power under s5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . .
Despite lingering uncertainty in the details,
however, the Court's cases through Croson had
established three general propositions with respect to
governmental racial classifications. First, skepticism:
' "[any preference based on racial or etinic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching
examination,' " Wygant, (plurality opinion of Powell,
J.); Fullilove, (opinion of Burger, C. J.) ...
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Second, consistency: "the standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification," Croson, (plurality opinion); i.e., all
racial classifications reviewable under the Equal
Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized. And
third, congruence: "[e]qual protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Taken together, these three
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify
any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutmy.....
A year later, however, the Court took a surprising
turn. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. F.C.C. involved a
Fifth Amendment challenge to two race-based policies
of the Federal Communications Commission. In
Metro Broadcasting, the Court repudiated the
long-held notion that "it would be unthinkable that the
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government" than it does on a state to afford
equal protection of the laws. It did so by holding that
"benign" Federal racial classifications need only
satisfy intermediate scrutiny, even though Croson had
recently concluded that such classifications enacted by
a state must satisfy strict scrutiny. "[B]enign" Federal
racial classifications, the Court said, "even if those
measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being
designed to compensate victims of past governmental
or societal discrimination, are constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." . . .
By adopting intermediate scrutiny as the standard
of review for Congressionally mandated "benign"
racial classifications, Metro Broadcasting departed
from prior cases in two significant respects. First, it
turned its back on Croson's explanation of why strict
scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is
essential:
"Absent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining
what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and
what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the
means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely
that there is little or no possibility that the motive
for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype." (plurality opinion of
O'CONNOR, J.).
We adhere to that view today, despite the surface
appeal of holding "benign" racial classifications to a
lower standard, because "it may not always be clear
that a so-called preference is in fact benign." Bakke,
(opinion of Powell, J.). "[Miore than good motives
should be required when government seeks to allocate
its resources by way of an explicit racial classification
system." Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L. J. 453, 485
(1987).
Second, Metro Broadcasting squarely rejected one
of the three propositions established by the Court's
earlier equal protection cases, namely, congruence
between the standards applicable to Federal and state
racial classifications, and in so doing also undermined
the other two - skepticism of all racial classifications,
and consistency of treatment irrespective of the race of
the burdened or benefited group. Under Metro
Broadcasting, certain racial classifications ("benign"
ones enacted by the Federal Government) should be
treated less skeptically than others; and the race of the
benefited group is critical to the determination of
which standard of review to apply. Metro
Broadcasting was thus a significant departure from
much of what had come before it.
The three propositions undermined by Metro
Broadcasting all derive from the basic principle that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows
from that principle that all governmental action based
on race a group classification long recognized as "in
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited" should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to insure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed. These
ideas have long been central to this Court's
understanding of equal protection, and holding
"benign" state and Federal racial classifications to
different standards does not square with them. "[A]
free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality" should tolerate no retreat from
the principle that government may treat people
differently because of their race only for the most
compelling reasons. Accordingly, we hold today that
all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
Federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests. To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding,
it is overruled....
By requiring strict scrutiny of racial
classifications, we require courts to make sure that a
governmental classification based on race, which "so
seldom providels] a relevant basis for disparate
treatment" Fullilove (STEVENS, J., dissenting), is
legitimate, before permitting unequal treatment based
on race to proceed. . .
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The principle of consistency simply means that
whenever the Government treats any person unequally
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. It
says nothing about the ultimate validity of any
particular law; that determination is the job of the
court applying strict scrutiny. The principle of
consistency explains the circumstances in which the
injury requiring strict scrutiny occurs. The application
of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the
infliction of that injury.
Consistency does recognize that any individual
suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by
the Government because of his or her race, whatever
that race may be.
JUSTICE STEVENS also claims that we have
ignored any difference between Federal and state
legislatures. But requiring that Congress, like the
states, enact racial classifications only when doing so
is necessary to further a "compelling interest" does not
contravene any principle of appropriate respect for a
co-equal branch of the Government. It is true that
various members of this Court have taken different
views of the authority s5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the
problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to
which courts should defer to Congress's exercise of
that authority. We need not, and do not, address these
differences today....
We think that requiring strict scrutiny is the best
way to ensure that courts will consistently give racial
classifications that kind of detailed examination, both
as to ends and as to means....
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Fullilove
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups
in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response
to it. . . .
When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within
constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.
Because our decision today alters the playing field
in some important respects, we think it best to remand
the case to the lower courts for further consideration in
light of the principles we have announced.
The question whether any of the ways in which
the Government uses subcontractor compensation
clauses can survive strict scrutiny, and any relevance
distinctions such as these may have to that question,
should be addressed in the first instance by the lower
courts.
BY JUSTICE SCALIA, Concurring
Ijoin the opinion of the Court, except Part III-C,
and except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the
following: In my view, government can never have a
"compelling interest" in discriminating on the basis of
race in order to "make up" for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction. Individuals
who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole, but under our
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or a debtor race. . . . To pursue the concept of
racial entitlement even for the most admirable and
benign of purposes is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race
slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.
BY JUSTICE THOMAS, Concurring
I agree with the majority's conclusion that strict
scrutiny applies to all government classifications
based on race. I write separately, however, to express
my disagreement with the premise underlying
JUSTICE STEVENS's and JUSTICE GINSBURG's
dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception to
the principle of equal protection. I believe that there is
a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence" between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that
distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to
foster some current notion of equality. Government
cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect
and protect us as equal before the law.
That these programs may have been motivated, in
part, by good intentions cannot provide refuge from
the principle that under our Constitution, the
Government may not make distinctions on the basis of
race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is
irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications
are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by
those who have a sincere desire to help those thought
to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the
paternansm mat appears to le at the heart of this
program is at war with the principle of inherent
equality that underlies and infuses our
Constitution....
So-called "benign" discrimination teaches many
that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such
programs engender attitudes of superiority or,
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who
believe that they have been wronged by the
Government's use of race. These programs stamp
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are "entitled" to preferences.
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FROM THE DISSENT
By Justice Stevens, With whom Justice Ginsburg
joins
Instead of deciding this case in accordance with
controlling precedent, the Court today delivers a
disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental
racial classifications. For its text the Court has
selected three propositions, represented by the
bywords "skepticism," "consistency" and
"congruence." . . .
The Court's concept of skepticism is, at least in
principle, a good statement of law and of common
sense. Undoubtedly, a court should be wary of a
governmental decision that relies upon a racial
classification. "Because racial characteristics so
seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate
treatment, and because classifications based on race
are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,"
a reviewing court must satisfy itself that the reasons
for any such classification are "clearly identified and
unquestionably legitimate." Fullilove v. Klutznick
(1980). This principle is explicit in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion, in Justice Powell's concurrence and
in my dissent in Fullilove. I welcome its renewed
endorsement by the Court today. But, as the opinions
in Fullilove demonstrate, substantial agreement on the
standard to be applied in deciding difficult cases does
not necessarily lead to agreement on how those cases
actually should or will be resolved. In my judgment,
because uniform standards are often anything but
uniform, we should evaluate the Court's comments on
"consistency," "congruence" and stare decisis with the
same type of skepticism that the Court advocates for
the underlying issue.
The Court's concept of "consistency" assumes
that there is no significant difference between a
decision by the majority to impose a special burden on
the members of a minority race and a decision by the
majority to provide a benefit to certain members of
that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on
some members of the majority. In my opinion that
assumption is untenable. There is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that
seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious
discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating
a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power
of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality
in society. No sensible conception of the
Government's constitutional obligation to "govern
impartially" should ignore this distinction. To
illustrate the point, consider our cases addressing the
Federal Government's discrimination against
Japanese-Americans during World War II,
Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsu v. United
States. The discrimination at issue in those cases was
invidious because the Government imposed special
burdens, a curfew and exclusion from certain areas on
the West Coast, on the members of a minority class
defined by racial and ethnic characteristics. Members
of the same racially defined class exhibited
exceptional heroism in the service of our country
during that war. Now suppose Congress decided to
reward that service with a Federal program that gave
all Japanese-American veterans an extraordinary
preference in Government employment. If Congress
had done so, the same racial characteristics that
motivated the discriminatory burdens in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu would have defined the preferred class
of veterans. Nevertheless, "consistency" surely would
not require us to describe the incidental burden on
everyone else in the country as "odious" or "invidious"
as those terms were used in those cases. We should
reject a concept of "consistency" that would view the
special preferences that the National Government has
provided to Native Americans since 1834 as
comparable to the official discrimination against
African-Americans that was prevalent for much of our
history.
The consistency that the Court espouses would
disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing"
sign and a welcome mat.... It would equate a law
that made black citizens ineligible for military service
with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers. An
attempt by the majority to exclude members of a
minority race from a regulated market is
fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that
market. An interest in "consistency" does not justify
treating differences as though they were similarities.
The Court's explanation for treating dissimilar
race-based decisions as though they were equally
objectionable is a supposed inability to differentiate
between "invidious" and "benign" discrimination. But
the term "affirmative action" is common and well
understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows
that people understand the difference between good
intentions and bad. As with any legal concept, some
cases may be difficult to classify, (footnote 4) but our
equal protection jurisprudence has identified a critical
difference between state action that imposes burdens
on a disfavored few and state action that benefits the
few "in spite of' its adverse effects on the many. . .
As a matter of constitutional and democratic
principle, a decision by representatives of the majority
to discriminate against the members of a minority race
is fundamentally different from those same
representatives' decision to impose incidental costs on
the majority of their constituents in order to provide a
benefit to a disadvantaged minority. In his
concurrence, JUSTICE THOMAS argues that the
most significant cost associated with an affirmative
action program is its adverse stigmatic effect on its
intended beneficiaries. Although I agree that this cost
may be more significant than many people realize, I
do not think it applies to the facts of this case. First,
this is not an argument that petitioner Adarand, a
white-owned business, has standing to advance. No
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beneficiaries of the specific program under attack
today have challenged its constitutionality, perhaps
because they do not find the preferences stigmatizing,
or perhaps because their ability to opt out of the
program provides them all the relief they would need.
Second, even if the petitioner in this case were a
minority-owned business challenging the stigmatizing
effect of this program, I would not find JUSTICE
THOMAS's extreme proposition that there is a moral
and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to
subjugate and an attempt to redress the effects of a
caste system at all persuasive. It is one thing to
question the wisdom of affirmative action programs:
there are many responsible arguments against them,
including the one based upon stigma, that Congress
might find persuasive when it decides whether to enact
or retain race-based preferences. It is another thing
altogether to equate the many well-meaning and
intelligent lawmakers and their constituents, whether
members of majority or minority races, who have
supported affirmative action over the years to
segregationists and bigots.
BY JUSTICE GINSBURG, Dissenting
The divisions in this difficult case should not
obscure the Court's recognition of the persistence of
racial inequality and a majority's acknowledgment of
Congress's authority to act affirmatively, not only to
end discrimination, but also to counteract
discrimination's lingering effects. Those effects,
reflective of a system of racial caste only recently
ended, are evident in our work places, markets and
neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes,
qualifications and interview styles still experience
different receptions, depending on their race. White
and African-American consumers still encounter
different deals. People of color looking for housing
still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real
estate agents and mortgage lenders. Minority
entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though
they are the low bidders, and they are sometimes
refuse work e afer winnling contracts. Bias both
conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that
must come down if equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this
country's law and practice. Given this history and its
practical consequences, Congress surely can conclude
that a carefully designed affirmative action program
may help to realize, finally, the "equal protection of
the laws" the Fourteenth Amendment has promised
since 1868.
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MISSOURI, et al., Petitioners
V.
Kalima JENKINS, et al.
Supreme Court of the United States
115 S.Ct. 2038
Decided June 12, 1995.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the
opinion of the Court.
As this school desegregation litigation enters its
18th year, we are called upon again to review the
decisions of the lower courts. In this case, the State of
Missouri has challenged the District Court's order of
salary increases for virtually all instructional and
noninstructional staff within the Kansas City,
Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and the District
Court's order requiring the State to continue to fund
remedial "quality education" programs because
student achievement levels were still "at or below
national norms at many grade levels."
I
The District Court's desegregation plan has been
described as the most ambitious and expensive
remedial program in the history of school
desegregation. The annual cost per pupil at the
KCMSD far exceeds that of the neighboring SSD's or
of any school district in Missouri. Nevertheless, the
KCMSD, which has pursued a "friendly adversary"
relationship with the plaintiffs, has continued to
propose ever more expensive programs. As a result,
the desegregation costs have escalated and now are
approaching an annual cost of $200 million. These
massive expenditures have financed high schools in
which every classroom will have air conditioning, an
alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a
2,000-sare-f tI planetar i u gree hose ad
vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned
meeting room for 104 people; a Model United
Nations wired for language translation; broadcast
capable radio and television studios with an editing
and animation lab; a temperature controlled art
gallery, movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500
square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room;
1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for
use in a zoo project, swimming pools; and numerous
other facilities.
The State, through the operation of
joint-and-several liability, has borne the brunt of these
costs. The District Court candidly has acknowledged
that it has "allowed the District planners to dream"
and "provided the mechanism for thiose] dreams to be
realized." In short, the District Court "has gone to
great lengths to provide KCMSD with facilities and
opportunities not available anywhere else in the
country."
II
Because of the importance of the issues, we
granted certiorari to consider the following: (1)
whether the District Court exceeded its constitutional
authority when it granted salary increases to virtually
all instructional and noninstructional employees of the
KCMSD, and (2) whether the District Court properly
relied upon the fact that student achievement test
scores had failed to rise to some unspecified level
when it declined to find that the State had achieved
partial unitary status as to the quality education
programs.
III
Here, however, the State has challenged the
District Court's approval of across-the-board salary
increases for instructional and noninstructional
employees as an action beyond its remedial authority.
An analysis of the permissible scope of the District
Court's remedial authority is necessary for a proper
determination of whether the order of salary increases
is beyond the District Court's remedial authority, and
thus, it is an issue subsidiary to our ultimate inquiry.
Given that the District Court's basis for its salary
order was grounded in "improving the desegregative
propriety of that reliance in order to resolve properly
the State's challenge to that order. We conclude that
a challenge to the scope of the District Court's remedy
is fairly included in the question presented.
Almost 25 years ago, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., we dealt with the
authority of a district court to fashion remedies for a
school district that had been segregated in law in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although recognizing the
discretion that must necessarily adhere in a district
court in fashioning a remedy, we also recognized the
limits on such remedial power: "[E]limination of
racial discrimination in public schools is a large task
and one that should not be retarded by efforts to
achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction
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of the school authorities. One vehicle can carry only
a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the
important objective of Brown I to seek to use school
desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope,
although desegregation of schools ultimately will have
impact on other forms of discrimination."
Proper analysis of the District Court's orders
challenged here, . . . must rest upon their serving as
proper means to the end of restoring the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of that conduct and their
eventual restoration of "state and local authorities to
the control of a school system that is operating in
compliance with the Constitution." We turn to that
analysis.
The State argues that the order approving salary
increases is beyond the District Court's authority
because it was crafted to serve an "interdistrict goal,"
in spite of the fact that the constitutional violation in
this case is "intradistrict" in nature. "[T]he nature of
the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation." The
proper response to an intradistrict violation is an
intradistrict remedy, that serves to eliminate the racial
identity of the schools within the effected school
district by eliminating, as far as practicable, the
vestiges of de jure segregation in all facets of their
operations.
Instead of seeking to remove the racial identity of
the various schools within the KCMSD, the District
Court has set out on a program to create a school
district that was equal to or superior to the
surrounding SSD's. Its remedy has focused on
"desegregative attractiveness," coupled with
"suburban comparability." Examination of the District
Court's reliance on "desegregative attractiveness" and
"suburban comparability" is instructive for our
ultimate resolution of the salary-order issue.
The purpose of desegregative attractiveness has
been not only to remedy the system-wide reduction in
student achievement, but also to attract nonminority
students not presently enrolled in the KCMSD. This
remedy has included an elaborate program of capital
improvements, course enrichment, and extracurricular
enhancement not simply in the formerly identifiable
black schools, but in schools throughout the district.
The District Court's remedial orders have converted
every senior high school, every middle school, and
one- half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD
into "magnet" schools. The District Court's remedial
order has all but made the KCMSD itself into a
magnet district.
We previously have approved of intradistrict
desegregation remedies involving magnet schools.
Magnet schools have the advantage of encouraging
voluntary movement of students within a school
district in a pattern that aids desegregation on a
voluntary basis, without requiring extensive busing
and redrawing of district boundary lines. As a
component in an intradistrict remedy, magnet schools
also are attractive because they promote desegregation
while limiting the withdrawal of white student
enrollment that may result from mandatory student
reassignment.
The District Court's remedial plan in this case,
however, is not designed solely to redistribute the
students within the KCMSD in order to eliminate
racially identifiable schools within the KCMSD.
instead, its purpose is to attract nonminority students
from outside the KCMSD schools. But this
interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the
intradistrict violation identified by the District Court.
In effect, the District Court has devised a remedy to
accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the
remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict
transfer of students.
Respondents argue that the District Court's
reliance upon desegregative attractiveness is justified
in light of the District Court's statement that
segregation has "led to white flight from the KCMSD
to suburban districts." The lower courts' "findings" as
to "white flight" are both inconsistent internally, and
inconsistent with the typical supposition, bolstered
here by the record evidence, that "white flight" may
result from desegregation, not de jure segregation.
The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that the
District Court's finding that "de jure segregation in the
KCMSD caused white students to leave the system
. is not inconsistent with the district court's earlier
conclusion that the suburban districts did nothing to
cause this white flight and therefore could not be
included in a mandatory interdistrict remedy." But the
District Court's earlier findings, affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, were not so limited:
"[C]ontrary to the argument of [plaintiffs] that the
[district court looked only to the culpability of the
SSDs, the scope of the order is far broader... . It
noted that only the schools in one district were
affected and that the remedy must be limited to that
system. In examining the cause and effect issue, the
court noted that 'not only is plaintiffs evidence here
blurred as to cause and effect, there is no "careful
delineation of the extent of the effect."' . . The
district court thus dealt not only with the issue
whether the SSDs were constitutional violators but
also whether there were significant interdistrict
segregative effects. . "When it did so, it made
specific findings that negate current significant
interdistrict effects, and concluded that the
requirements of Milliken had not been met."
The District Court's pursuit of "desegregative
attractiveness" cannot be reconciled with our cases
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placing limitations on a district court's remedial
authority. It is certainly theoretically possible that the
greater the expenditure per pupil within the KCMSD,
the more likely it is that some unknowable number of
nonminority students not presently attending schools
in the KCMSD will choose to enroll in those schools.
Under this reasoning, however, every increased
expenditure, whether it be for teachers,
noninstructional employees, books, or buildings, will
make the KCMSD in some way more attractive, and
thereby perhaps induce nonminority students to enroll
in its schools. But this rationale is not susceptible to
any objective limitation.
This case provides numerous examples
demonstrating the limitless authority of the District
Court operating under this rationale. In short,
desegregative attractiveness has been used "as the
hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about
improving the quality of education in general within
the KCMSD."
Nor are there limits to the duration of the District
Court's involvement. The expenditures per pupil in
the KCMSD currently far exceed those in the
neighboring SSD's Sixteen years after this litigation
began, the District Court recognized that the KCMSD
has yet to offer a viable method of financing the
"wonderful school system being built." Each
additional program ordered by the District Court--and
financed by the State--to increase the "desegregative
attractiveness" of the school district makes the
KCMSD more and more dependent on additional
funding from the State; in turn, the greater the
KCMSD's dependence on state funding, the greater its
reliance on continued supervision by the District
Court. But our cases recognize that local autonomy of
school districts is a vital national tradition, and that a
district court must strive to restore state and local
authorities to the control of a school system operating
in compliance with the Constitution.
The District Court's pursuit of the goal of
"desegregative attractiveness" results in so many
imponderables and is so far removed from the task of
eliminating the racial identifiability of the schools
within the KCMSD that we believe it is beyond the
admittedly broad discretion of the District Court. In
this posture, we conclude that the District Court's
order of salary increases, which was "grounded in
remedying the vestiges of segregation by improving
the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD," is
simply too far removed from an acceptable
implementation of a permissible means to remedy
previous legally mandated segregation.
Similar considerations lead us to conclude that the
District Court's order requiring the State to continue
to fund the quality education programs because
student achievement levels were still "at or below
national norms at many grade levels" cannot be
sustained. The State does not seek from this Court a
declaration of partial unitary status with respect to the
quality education programs. It challenges the
requirement of indefinite funding of a quality
education program until national norms are met, based
on the assumption that while a mandate for significant
educational improvement, both in teaching and in
facilities, may have been justified originally, its
indefinite extension is not.
The basic task of the District Court is to decide
whether the reduction in achievement by minority
students attributable to prior de jure segregation has
been remedied to the extent practicable. Under our
precedents, the State and the KCMSD are "entitled to
a rather precise statement of [their] obligations under
a desegregation decree." Although the District Court
has determined that "[s]egregation has caused a
system wide reduction in achievement in the schools
of the KCMSD," it never has identified the
incremental effect that segregation has had on minority
student achievement or the specific goals of the
quality education programs.
In reconsidering this order, the District Court
should apply our three-part test from Freeman v. Pitts.
The District Court should consider that the State's role
with respect to the quality education programs has
been limited to the funding, not the implementation, of
those programs. As all the parties agree that
improved achievement on test scores is not necessarily
required for the State to achieve partial unitary status
as to the quality education programs, the District
Court should sharply limit, if not dispense with, its
reliance on this factor. Just as demographic changes
independent of de jure segregation will affect the
racial composition of student assignments, so too will
numerous external factors beyond the control of the
KCMSD and the State affect minority student
achievement. So long as these external factors are not
the result of segregation, they do not figure in the
remedial calculus. Insistence upon academic goals
unrelated to the effects of legal segregation
unwarrantably postpones the day when the KCMSD
will be abie to operate on its own.
The District Court also should consider that many
goals of its quality education plan already have been
attained: the KCMSD now is equipped with
"facilities and opportunities not available anywhere
else in the country." KCMSD schools received an
AAA rating eight years ago, and the present remedial
programs have been in place for seven years. It may
be that in education, just as it may be in economics, a
"rising tide lifts all boats," but the remedial quality
education program should be tailored to remedy the
injuries suffered by the victims of prior de jure
segregation. Minority students in kindergarten
through grade 7 in the KCMSD always have attended
AAA-rated schools; minority students in the KCMSD
that previously attended schools rated below AAA
have since received remedial education programs for
a period of up to seven years.
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On remand, the District Court must bear in mind
that its end purpose is not only "to remedy the
violation" to the extent practicable, but also "to restore
state and local authorities to the control of a school
system that is operating in compliance with the
Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice O'CONNOR, concurring.
School desegregation remedies are intended, "as
all remedies are, to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such conduct." In the
paradigmatic case of an interdistrict violation, where
district boundaries are drawn on the basis of race, a
regional remedy is appropriate to ensure integration
across district lines. So too where surrounding
districts contribute to the constitutional violation by
affirmative acts intended to segregate the races--e.g.,
where those districts "arrang[e] for white students
residing in the Detroit District to attend schools in
Oakland and Macomb Counties." Milliken I of course
permits interdistrict remedies in these instances of
interdistrict violations. Beyond that, interdistrict
remedies are also proper where "there has been a
constitutional violation within one district that
produces a significant segregative effect in another
district." Such segregative effect may be present
where a predominantly black district accepts black
children from adjacent districts, or perhaps even where
the fact of intradistrict segregation actually causes
whites to flee the district, for example, to avoid
discriminatorily underfunded schools--and such
actions produce regional segregation along district
lines. In those cases, where a purely intradistrict
violation has caused a significant interdistrict
segregative effect, certain interdistrict remedies may
be appropriate. Where, however, the segregative
effects of a district's constitutional violation are
contained within that district's boundaries, there is no
justification for a remedy that is interdistrict in nature
and scope.
Here, where the District Court found that
KCMSD students attended schools separated by their
race and that facilities have "literally rotted, the
district court of course should order restorations and
remedies that would place previously segregated black
KCMSD students at par with their white KCMSD
counterparts. The District Court went further,
however, and ordered certain improvements to
KCMSD as a whole, including schools that were not
previously segregated; these district-wide remedies
may also be justified (the State does not argue the
point here) in light of the finding that segregation
caused "a system wide reduction in student
achievement in the schools of the KCMSD." Such
remedies obviously may benefit some who did not
suffer under--and, indeed, may have even profited
from--past segregation. There is no categorical
constitutional prohibition on non-victims enjoying the
collateral, incidental benefits of a remedial plan
designed "to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in
the absence of such conduct." Thus, if restoring
KCMSD to unitary status would attract whites into
the school district, such a reversal of the white exodus
would be of no legal consequence.
What the District Court did in this case, however,
and how it transgressed the constitutional bounds of
its remedial powers, is to make desegregative
attractiveness the underlying goal of its remedy for the
specific purpose of reversing the trend of white flight.
However troubling that trend may be, remedying it is
within the District Court's authority only if it is
"directly caused by the constitutional violation." The
Court and the dissent attempt to reconcile the different
statements by the lower courts as to whether white
flight was caused by segregation or desegregation.
One fact, however, is uncontroverted. When the
District Court found that KCMSD was racially
segregated, the constitutional violation from which all
remedies flow in this case, it also found that there was
neither an interdistrict violation nor significant
interdistrict segregative effects. Whether the white
exodus that has resulted in a school district that is
68% black was caused by the District Court's
remedial orders or by natural, if unfortunate,
demographic forces, we have it directly from the
District Court that the segregative effects of
KCMSD's constitutional violation did not transcend
its geographical boundaries. In light of that finding,
the District Court cannot order remedies seeking to
rectify regional demographic trends that go beyond the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation.
This case, like other school desegregation
litigation, is concerned with "the elimination of the
discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not
with myriad factors of human existence which can
cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial,
religious, or ethnic grounds." Those myriad factors
are not readily corrected by judicial intervention, but
are best addressed by the representative branches;
time and again, we have recognized the ample
authority legislatures possess to combat racial
injustice. It is true that where such legislative efforts
classify persons on the basis of their race, we have
mandated strict judicial scrutiny to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not
been infringed. But it is not true that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact." It is only by
applying strict scrutiny that we can distinguish
between unconstitutional discrimination and narrowly
tailored remedial programs that legislatures may enact
to further the compelling governmental interest in
redressing the effects of past discrimination,
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Courts, however, are different. The necessary
restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority contained
in Article III of the Constitution limit the judiciary's
institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for
societal ills. The unfortunate fact of racial imbalance
and bias in our society, however pervasive or
invidious, does not admit of judicial intervention
absent a constitutional violation. Thus, even though
the Civil War Amendments altered the balance of
authority between federal and state legislatures,
Justice THOMAS cogently observes that "what the
federal courts cannot do at the federal level they
cannot do against the States; in either case, Article III
courts are constrained by the inherent constitutional
limitations on their powers." Unlike Congress, which
enjoys "'discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,"' federal courts have no
comparable license and must always observe their
limited judicial role. Indeed, in the school
desegregation context, federal courts are specifically
admonished to "take into account the interests of state
and local authorities in managing their own affairs,"
in light of the intrusion into the area of education,
"where States historically have been sovereign," and
"to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise."
In this case, it may be the "myriad factors of
human existence," that have prompted the white
exodus from KCMSD, and the District Court cannot
justify its transgression of the above constitutional
principles simply by invoking desegregative
attractiveness. The Court today discusses
desegregative attractiveness only insofar as it supports
the salary increase order under review, and properly
refrains from addressing the propriety of all the
remedies that the District Court has ordered, revised,
and extended in the 18-year history of this case.
These remedies may also be improper to the extent
that they serve the same goals of desegregative
attractiveness and suburban comparability that we
hold today to be impermissible, and, conversely, the
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without reliance on these goals. But these are
questions that the Court rightly leaves to be answered
on remand. For now, it is enough to affirm the
principle that "the nature of the desegregation remedy
is to be determined by the nature and scope of the
constitutional violation."
For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court.
Justice THOMAS, concurring.
It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so
willing to assume that anything that is predominantly
black must be inferior. Instead of focusing on
remedying the harm done to those black school
children injured by segregation, the District Court here
sought to convert the Kansas City, Missouri, School
District (KCMSD) into a "magnet district" that would
reverse the "white flight" caused by desegregation. In
this respect, I join the Court's decision concerning the
two remedial issues presented for review. I write
separately, however, to add a few thoughts with
respect to the overall course of this litigation. In order
to evaluate the scope of the remedy, we must
understand the scope of the constitutional violation
and the nature of the remedial powers of the federal
courts.
Two threads in our jurisprudence have produced
this unfortunate situation, in which a District Court
has taken it upon itself to experiment with the
education of the KCMSD's black youth. First, the
court has read our cases to support the theory that
black students suffer an unspecified psychological
harm from segregation that retards their mental and
educational development. This approach not only
relies upon questionable social science research rather
than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an
assumption of black inferiority. Second, we have
permitted the federal courts to exercise virtually
unlimited equitable powers to remedy this alleged
constitutional violation. The exercise of this authority
has trampled upon principles of federalism and the
separation of powers and has freed courts to pursue
other agendas unrelated to the narrow purpose of
precisely remedying a constitutional harm.
I
A
The mere fact that a school is black does not
mean that it is the product of a constitutional
violation. A "racial imbalance does not itself
establish a violation of the Constitution." Instead, in
order to find unconstitutional segregation, we require
that plaintiffs "prove all of the essential elements of de
jure segregation--that is, stated simply, a current
condition of segregation resulting from intentional
state action directed specifically to the [allegedly
segregated] schools." "[Tihe differentiating factor
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate."
In the present case, the District Court inferred a
continuing constitutional violation from two primary
facts: the existence of de jure segregation in the
KCMSD prior to 1954, and the existence of de facto
segregation today. The District Court found that in
1954, the KCMSD operated 16 segregated schools for
black students, and that in 1974, 39 schools in the
district were more than 90% black. Desegregation
efforts reduced this figure somewhat, but the District
Court stressed that 24 schools remained "racially
isolated," that is, more than 90% black, in 1983-1984.
For the District Court, it followed that the KCMSD
had not dismantled the dual system entirely. The
District Court also concluded that because of the
KCMSD's failure to "become integrated on a
system-wide basis," the dual system still exerted
"lingering effects" upon KCMSD black students,
whose "general attitude of inferiority" produced "low
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achievement. . which ultimately limits employment
opportunities and causes poverty."
Without more, the District Court's findings could
not have supported a finding of liability against the
state. It should by now be clear that the existence of
one-race schools is not by itself an indication that the
State is practicing segregation. The continuing "racial
isolation" of schools after de jure segregation has
ended may well reflect voluntary housing choices or
other private decisions. Here, for instance, the
demography of the entire KCMSD has changed
considerably since 1954. Though blacks accounted
for only 18.9% of KCMSD's enrollment in 1954, by
1983-1984 the school district was 67.7% black. That
certain schools are overwhelmingly black in a district
that is now more than two-thirds black is hardly a sure
sign of intentional state action.
I
This Court should never approve a State's efforts
to deny students, because of their race, an equal
opportunity for an education. But the federal courts
also should avoid using racial equality as a pretext for
solving social problems that do not violate the
Constitution. It seems apparent to me that the District
Court undertook the worthy task of providing a quality
education to the children of KCMSD. As far as I can
tell, however, the District Court sought to bring new
funds and facilities into the KCMSD by finding a
constitutional violation on the part of the State where
there was none. Federal courts should not lightly
assume that States have caused "racial isolation" in
1984 by maintaining a segregated school system in
1954. We must forever put aside the notion that
simply because a school district today is black, it must
be educationally inferior.
Even if segregation were present, we must
remember that a deserving end does not justify all
possible means. The desire to reform a school district,
or any other institution, cannot so captivate the
Judiciary thai frgets its conIstituti.onall madated
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role. Usurpation of the traditionally local control over
education not only takes the judiciary beyond its
proper sphere, it also deprives the States and their
elected officials of their constitutional powers. At
some point, we must recognize that the judiciary is not
omniscient, and that all problems do not require a
remedy of constitutional proportions.
Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS,
Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join,
dissenting.
III
The two discrete questions that we actually
accepted for review are, then, answerable on their own
terms without any need to consider whether the
District Court's use of the magnet school concept in its
remedial plan is itself constitutionally vulnerable. The
capacity to deal thus with the questions raised,
coupled with the unfairness of doing otherwise
without warning, are enough to demand a dissent.
The attractiveness of the Court's analysis
disappears, . . . soon as we recognize two things.
First, the District Court did not mean by an
"intradistrict violation" what the Court apparently
means by it today. The District Court meant that the
violation within the KCMSD had not led to
segregation outside of it, and that no other school
districts had played a part in the violation. It did not
mean that the violation had not produced effects of
any sort beyond the district. Indeed, the record that
we have indicates that the District Court understood
that the violation here did produce effects spanning
district borders and leading to greater segregation
within the KCMSD, the reversal of which the District
Court sought to accomplish by establishing magnet
schools. Insofar as the Court assumes that this was
not so in fact, there is at least enough in the record to
cast serious doubt on its assumption. Second, the
Court violates existing case law even on its own
apparent view of the facts, that the segregation
violation within the KCMSD produced no proven
effects, segregative or otherwise, outside it. Assuming
this to be true, the Court's decision that the rule
against interdistrict remedies for intradistrict
violations applies to this case, solely because the
remedy here is meant to produce effects outside the
district in which the violation occurred, is flatly
contrary to established precedent.
Without the contradiction, the Court has nothing
to justify its rejection of the District Court's finding
that segregation caused white flight but its supposition
that flight results from integration, not segregation.
The supposition, and the distinction on which it rests,
are untenable. At the more obvious level, there is in
fact no break in the chain of causation linking the
effects of desegregation with those of segregation.
There would be no desegregation orders and no
remedial plans without prior unconstitutional
segregation as the occasion for issuing and adopting
them, and an adverse reaction to a desegregation order
is traceable in fact to the segregation that is subject to
the remedy. When the Court quotes the District
Court's reference to abundant evidence that integration
caused flight to the suburbs, then, it quotes nothing
inconsistent with the District Court's other findings
that segregation had caused the flight. The only
difference between the statements lies in the point to





To the substantial likelihood that the Court
proceeds on erroneous assumptions of fact must be
added corresponding errors of law. We have most
recently summed up the obligation to correct the
condition of de jure segregation by saying that "the
duty of a former de jure district is to take 'whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch..' Although the fashioning ofjudicial
remedies to this end has been left, in the first instance,
to the equitable discretion of the district courts, in
Milliken I we established an absolute limitation on
this exercise of equitable authority. "[W]ithout an
interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is
no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict
remedy."
The Court proceeds as if there is no question but
that this proscription applies to this case. But the
proscription does not apply. We are not dealing here
with an interdistrict remedy in the sense that Milliken
I used the term.
We did not hold, however, that any remedy that
takes into account conditions outside of the district in
which a constitutional violation has been committed
is an "interdistrict remedy," and as such improper in
the absence of an "interdistrict violation." To the
contrary, by emphasizing that remedies in school
desegregation cases are grounded in traditional
equitable principles, we left open the possibility that
a district court might subject a proven constitutional
wrongdoer to a remedy with intended effects going
beyond the district of the wrongdoer's violation, when
such a remedy is necessary to redress the harms
flowing from the constitutional violation.
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Washington -- The Justice Department, advising
federal agencies on the fate of scores of federal
affirmative action programs, raised the prospect
yesterday that many of those plans could not now
survive a constitutional challenge.
A 37-page memo was sent to the top legal
officers of all government departments and
commissions. It is the first "preliminary" attempt by
the government to assess the effects of the Supreme
Court's recent 5-4 ruling that national programs
based on race must satisfy the toughest
constitutional test, or cease to exist.
That test says that race cannot be used as a
public policy factor unless the government has the
strongest reasons for doing so, and even then may
be used only narrowly.
The memo, by Assistant Attorney General
Walter E. Dellinger, is to guide the agencies' legal
staffs in assessing whether to keep, alter or drop
160 federal programs that use race as a factor in
deciding who receives public benefits, including
jobs, contracts and money.
No program should be cast aside, Mr. Dellinger
stressed, until after it has been analyzed under the
new Justice Department guidelines. Moreover,
President Clinton and White House aides are
engaged in their own study of affirmative action
plans, a study that may result in new
government-wide policies.
Mr. Dellinger's office does not operate solely as
a legal counselor within the Justice Department. Its
role is to give legal advice that the entire executive
branch is expected to follow on major legal and
constitutional issues that affect the government.
The Dellinger memo did not point to any
particular program that would be in trouble. But it
did indicate that these types are now most
vulnerable to challenge:
* Plans set up by agencies on their own without
being ordered to do so explicitly by Congress. Most
plans are agency-drafted, not congressionally
mandated.
* Those plans created to assure blacks and
other minorities that they would be included, just so
that the programs have "diversity" and not
specifically to cure past racial discrimination in
those programs.
* Those that simply assume that society has a
history of bias against minorities, so that the
agency's plans are not linked to clear evidence of
discrimination or to the leftover effects of
discrimination.
* Those set up without any significant study of
whether discrimination was a problem that needed
a solution from that particular agency.
* Those that use numerical quotas or
"set-asides" rather than flexibly reacting to past
discrimination or its present effects.
* Those that have no provision for periodic
review to determine whether the plans still are
needed.
* Those that use race as the sole factor in
deciding who is included rather than as one factor
among several.
The Dellinger memo said that programs in
those categories may not necessarily fail the
constitutional test newly imposed by the Supreme
Court, and that government departments may still
be able to prove a need for some affirmative action
to deal with racial bias in the nation.
But the document stressed the need for officials
to build a strong case to justify the use of race, to
make sure that race is used in as narrow a way as
possible, and to weigh alternative programs not
based on race before setting up one controlled by
race.
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As dean of the University of Texas Law School,
Mark G. Yudoffaced a familiar concern that he called
the "pool problem."
Highly competitive graduate and professional
schools such as his were scouring the countryside for
academically superior black and Latino students. But
the pool of such students was shallow, at least as
measured by grades and standard tests.
Texas solved that problem in a familiar way, by
giving blacks and Mexican Americans a preference in
the admissions process. Now its solution, challenged
in the federal courts by a disappointed white student,
has become central to the national debate over
affirmative action.
The case, which will soon go before a federal
appeals court in New Orleans, could overturn
educational affirmative action plans nationwide. Its
aftershocks could be felt in a host of other fields.
Both sides in the Texas case say they will appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court if they lose before the
appeals court. And many legal experts say they believe
that the high court is ready to take a critical look at
affirmative action in higher education for the first time
since the landmark 1978 ruling in the Allan Bakke
case in California.
The Texas law school takes in 500 students each
year. It admits applicants who on average score better
than 85% of all college graduates who take the Law
School Admissions Test and have a 3.5 college
grade-point average.
In 1992, however, only 88 African Americans and
52 Mexican Americans in the entire nation sought
admission to law school with those credentials. While
Texas rates in the top 20 of the nation's 175 law
schools, it stands well below Harvard University, Yale
University, Stanford University, the University of
Chicago, Columbia University, the University of
Virginia, Duke University and UC Berkeley in its
ability to lure top minority students.
Consequently, to meet its goal of a "diverse" class
including nearly 100 blacks and Latinos, Texas must
admit minority students from out of state with lesser
academic qualifications, while rejecting
higher-achieving white applicants who reside in
Texas.
"That's the situation we are facing, and I think we
have to be candid about it," Yudof, now the university
provost, said in an interview. "To some extent, we are
in a bidding war" for talented minority students.
Cheryl J. Hopwood believes that she is one of the
casualties of that war.
Hopwood has had her share of hardships. Her
father, a Vietnam War veteran, left home when she
was a child. Her mother worked three jobs to support
her family. She herself is raising a severely
handicapped daughter.
As a college student, Hopwood paid her way by
working at least 20 hours a week and still managed to
attain a 3.8 grade-point average. Her LSAT score
ranked her at the 83rd percentile. But in 1992, the
Texas law school turned down her application without
explanation.
But she thinks she knows why. Aided by a
conservative legal organization, she filed a lawsuit
contending that she was discriminated against because
of her race.
"I thought I was disadvantaged too, but that didn't
count for me," Hopwood said. Her case has been
dubbed "Bakke II" in higher-education circles.
The Bakke case split the nine Supreme Court
justices in 1978. On the one hand, they said the
University of California had wrongly denied
admission to a highly qualified white candidate
through the use of racial quotas. On the other, they
said, colleges could use race as a "plus factor" in favor
of minority students as they sought to achieve diverse
student bodies.
Ever since, college admissions officers have cited
the Bakke case as justification for broad affirmative
action efforts.
Lawyers for Hopwood said the Texas law school,
like many other university programs, uses the kind of
quota-like system that was condemned in the Bakke
decision.
"They made race the predominant factor in
admissions," said Michael McDonald, an attorney for
the Center for Individual Rights, the conservative
Washington, D.C.-based group that is financing
Hopwood's suit. "This case is a perfect vehicle" for a
re-examination of the Bakke decision "because it
shines a light on practices that have become nearly
universal in higher education."
In trial testimony last year, law school officials
revealed that they routinely "color-coded" applications
by the race or ethnic background of the students.
While white, Asian and non-Mexican Latino students
were evaluated by the regular admissions committee,
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African American and Mexican American applicants
were put in a separate file. A single admissions officer
reviewed them and decided who would be admitted.
Memos exchanged by admissions committee
members also speak candidly about using "what is in
essence a quota system" to obtain the right number of
minority students.
"Without some sort of quota as a reference," one
1989 memo said, "virtually none" of the African
American and Mexican American applicants would be
admitted.
Hopwood's lawyers, citing this evidence, call the
law school's admissions process unconstitutional
because it "was driven by overt racial preferences."
University of Texas officials do not deny giving a
clear preference to minority applicants. But they argue
that this sort of affirmative action is both justified and
necessary, especially at a leading state university.
"I don't think you can have a public institution
that is lily white," Yudof said. "Our basic approach is
to look for good people who may not have the same
paper qualifications. They are probably a shade lower.
But they will go on to graduate and they will be a
credit to their community."
"This state is nearly 50% brown and black, and
the UT law school trains the leadership for the state,"
added Samuel Issacharoff a law professor who argued
the school's case in the courts. The university would
not be doing its job, he said, if it enrolled a law class
without a reasonable number of black and Latino
students.
In its court briefs, the university also highlighted
its own abysmal history of racial discrimination.
The law school excluded blacks until 1950, when
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
university system's separate law school for blacks was
equal to the University of Texas school. It ordered the
admission of Heman Sweatt, an African American.
The ruling, in the case of Sweatt vs. Painter,
proved to be steppingstone to the landmark Brown vs.
Board of Education ruling four years later that finally
declared racial segregation unconstitutional. As it
happened, Sweatt never finished law school. A hostile
reception drove him out before he could graduate.
"As late as 1971-20 years after Heman Sweatt left
the law school humiliated by the taunts and threats of
students and faculty-the entering class had no blacks,"
the school told the appeals court.
With that history and a need to train talented
minority leaders, the university argued in the
Hopwood case, "modest affirmative steps" in favor of
African American and Mexican American applicants
were justified.
The university won the support of law school
leaders around the country. When the case went to
trial in U.S. District Court in Austin, Stanford Law
Dean Paul Brest testified about the importance of
affirmative action.
"Diversity in higher education, and especially in
law school, is extremely important," he said. A ruling
striking down the Texas system, he predicted, "would
likely have a spillover effect" at other schools.
Judge Sam Sparks, himself a UT Law School
graduate, tried to split the difference. He agreed that
the school had violated the law by admitting minority
students under a separate system. Nonetheless, he
ruled for the university because Hopwood did not
prove that she should have been admitted.
Had students been admitted "without regard to
race or ethnicity," the judge concluded, "the entering
class would have included, at most, nine blacks and 18
Mexican Americans," numbers he characterized as
"woefully inadequate."
How great is the gap between regularly admitted
applicants and minority students? The university calls
it trivial; Hopwood's lawyers describe it as significant.
The law school admits students based on a "Texas
index" that combines their grade average and LSAT
score. That scale has been shown to predict rather
accurately how students will fare in law school.
Hopwood's lawyers examined the index for the
entire class that was admitted in 1992 and found that
only one of the 41 African American students and
three of the 55 Mexican Americans had totals that
matched hers. In fact, they said, 12 other white
students with even better qualifications than Hopwood
were also denied admission.
The Texas admissions process, they concluded,
"creates a quota system to virtually guarantee" the
admission of a particular number of minority students.
The university countered that the minority
students who are accepted have excellent
qualifications. For example, black students who were
enrolled that year had a median 3.3 grade-point
average and Mexican Americans had a 3.24 average,
only slightly below the median of 3.52 for the entire
class.
During the early 1980s, the university conceded
that only half of its minority graduates were passing
the state bar exam on the first try, an embarrassing
statistic for the state's premier law school. But in
recent years, Yudof said, the university's aggressive
recruitment program has drawn capable minority
students who fare well on the bar exams.
Jonathan Quander, an African American who is
president of the law students association, said he
enrolled at the Texas law school after getting his
undergraduate degree from Yale in part because Texas
showed a commitment to affirmative action.
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"I wouldn't have felt comfortable if I was the only
African American male," he said. "I would have gone
to Georgetown or Michigan or Duke."
Even Hopwood's lawyers have not tried to portray
the past as the good old days.
Today's minority students at Texas, they
acknowledged, are on average better qualified than the
all-white classes of the 1950s and '60s. Then the law
school admitted every university graduate who
applied, although about one-third of them quickly
flunked out.
Instead, Hopwood's lawyers called her a victim of
a new type of unfairness. While affirmative action
opens the doors for some, they said, it closes
opportunities for others. Hopwood, working part-time
as an accountant, said that she has not given up on her
goal of becoming a lawyer.
"This is a woman with a blue-collar,
working-class background who had to work very
hard," McDonald said. "She is raising a severely
handicapped child. She had good grades and good test
scores, and for all that, she gets the door slammed in
her face."
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94-805 BUSH v. VERA
Congressional redistricting-Race-Strict scruti-
ny-Standing.
Ruling below (DC STexas, 861 F.Supp. 1304):
Three of Texas' 30 congressional districts (spe-
cifically districts 18, 29, and 30), all of which
were created after 1990 census with aid of com-
puter technology that can superimpose block-by-
block racial census statistics on detailed local
maps vital to redistricting process, are bizarrely
shaped, racially gerrymandered districts, created
solely to provide "safe" seats in Congress for two
African-American representatives and one His-
panic representative, and thus violate Equal Pro-
tection Clause as construed in Shaw v. Reno, 61
LW 4818 (US SupCt 1993); although compli-
ance with Voting Rights Act might be compelling
state interest in creating bizarrely shaped dis- Questions presented: (1) Are configurations of
tricts that, if narrowly tailored, would withstand three Texas minority opportunity districts created
strict scrutiny demanded of racial classifications to comply with Voting Rights Act explainable on
under Fourteenth Amendment, Voting Rights grounds other than race, thereby making strict
Act may not be used to justify "racial apartheid" scrutiny improper, when parallel, more compactly
that Shaw and Fourteenth Amendment condemn; shaped minority opportunity districts demonstra-
because burden of production of plaintiffs chal- bly could have been drawn in same vicinity but
lenging districting extends solely to race con- were not for non-racial state policy reasons? (2)
sciousness of challenged districts, combined with Does narrow tailoring to meet compelling interest
disregard of traditional districting criteria, state of compliance with Voting Rights Act require
has burden of producing evidence of narrow tai- Texas to set aside other non-racial, traditional
loring to achieve its compelling state interest districting principles, ignore politics, and draw
under Voting Rights Act; in any event, state does only those minority opportunity districts conform-
not seriously argue that challenged districts were ing to most idealized possible version of compact
narrowly tailored to fulfill state's obligations un- shape? (3) Do Texas congressional districts 18,
der Voting Rights Act-task that "would have 29, and 30-all localized, essentially single-coun-
been nigh impossible"; furthermore, in light of ty urban districts and all minority opportunity
evidence that state could have reached its goal of districts under Voting Rights Act-fall outside
creating maiority-minority districts by foflowing threshold of bizarreness outlined in Shaw v.
traditional districting criteria-compactness, con- Reno? (4) Is statewide redistricting plan creating
tiguity, natural geographical boundaries, and Texas congressional districts 18, 29, and 30 con-
neighborhood preservation-state has not carried sistent with Equal Protection Clause as interpret-
its burden of production on issue of narrow tailor- ed in Shaw? (5) Is consistent state tradition of
ing; to be narrowly tailored, district must have incumbency protection in congressional redistrict-
least possible amount of irregularity in shape, ing within category of traditional districting prin-
making allowances for traditional districting ciples that make strict scrutiny inappropriate un-
criteria. der Shaw v. Reno if observed in redistricting
plan? (6) Is injury-in-fact element of constitution-
al standing satisfied in equal protection redistrict-
ing case by plaintiffs who do not claim vote
dilution, who are not object of invidious discrimi-
nation by challenged plan, and whose only identi-
fied harm is not living in state whose congression-
al redistricting plan is designed wholly without
race consciousness? (7) Did district court exceed
its equitable powers by ordering state legislaturc
to enact remedial legislation by specific date?
Appeal filed 10/3 1/94, by Dan Morales, Texas
Atty. Gen., Jorge Vegas, First Asst. Atty. Gen.,
and Renea Hicks, State Solicitor.
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94-988 U.S. v. VERA
Congressional redistricting-Race and ethnic-
ity-Bizarre district configurations.
Ruling below (Vera v. Richards, DC STexas,
861 F.Supp. 1304):
Three of Texas' 30 congressional districts (spe-
cifically districts 18, 29, and 30), all of which
were created after 1990 census with aid of com-
puter technology that can superimpose block-by-
block racial census statistics on detailed local
maps vital to redistricting process, are bizarrely
shaped, racially gerrymandered districts, created
solely to provide "safe" seats in Congress for two
African-American representatives and one His-
panic representative, and thus violate Equal Pro-
tection Clause as construed in Shaw v. Reno, 61
LW 4818 (US SupCt 1993); although compli-
ance with Voting Rights Act might be compelling
state interest in creating bizarrely shaped dis-
tricts that, if narrowly tailored, would withstand
strict scrutiny demanded of racial classifications
under Fourteenth Amendment, Voting Rights
Act may not be used to justify "racial apartheid"
that Shaw and Fourteenth Amendment condemn;
because burden of production of plaintiffs chal-
lenging districting extends solely to race con-
sciousness of challenged districts, combined with
disregard of traditional districting criteria, state
has burden of producing evidence of narrow tai-
loring to achieve its compelling state interest
under Voting Rights Act; in any event, state does
not seriously argue that challenged districts were
narrowly tailored to fulfill state's obligations un-
der Voting Rights Act-task that "would have
been nigh impossible"; furthermore, in light of
evidence that state could have reached its goal of
creating majority-minority districts by following
traditional districting criteria-compactness, con-
tiguity, natural geographical boundaries, and
neighborhood preservation-state has not carried
its burden of production on issue of narrow tailor-
ing; to be narrowly tailored, district must have
least possible amount of irregularity in shape,
making allowances for traditional districting
criteria.
Question presented: Are Districts 18, 29, and
30 in Texas' congressional redistricting plan nar-
rowly tailored to further compelling interest?
Appeal filed 12/1/94, by Drew S. Days III,
Sol. Gen., Deval L. Patrick, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Paul Bender, Dpty. Sol. Gen., Irving L. Gorn-
stein, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and Steven H. Rosen-
baum and Mark L. Gross, Justice Dept. Attys.
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94-806 LAWSON v. VERA
Congressional redistricting-Race-Strict scruti-
ny-Standing.
Ruling below (Vera v. Richards, DC STexas,
861 F.Supp. 1304):
Three of Texas' 30 congressional districts (spe-
cifically districts 18, 29, and 30), all of which
were created after 1990 census with aid of com-
puter technology that can superimpose block-by-
block racial census statistics on detailed local
maps vital to redistricting process, are bizarrely
shaped, racially gerrymandered districts, created
solely to provide "safe" seats in Congress for two
African-American representatives and one His-
panic representative, and thus violate Equal Pro-
tection Clause as construed in Shaw v. Reno, 61
LW 4818 (US SupCt 1993); although compli-
ance with Voting Rights Act might be compelling
state interest in creating bizarrely shaped dis-
tricts that, if narrowly tailored, would withstand
strict scrutiny demanded of racial classifications
under Fourteenth Amendment, Voting Rights
Act may not be used to justify "racial apartheid"
that Shaw and Fourteenth Amendment condemn;
because burden of production of plaintiffs chal-
lenging districting extends solely to race con-
sciousness of challenged districts, combined with
disregard of traditional districting criteria, state
has burden of producing evidence of narrow tai-
loring to achieve its compelling state interest
under Voting Rights Act; in any event, state does
not seriously argue that challenged districts were
narrowly tailorcd to fu!hi!l state's obligations un-
der Vo'ig Rights A.t-task that "would have
been nigh impossible"; furthermore, in light of
evidence that state could have reached its goal of
creating majority-minority districts by following
traditional districting criteria-compactness, con-
tiguity, natural geographical boundaries, and
neighborhood preservation-state has not carried
its burden of production on issue of narrow tailor-
ing; to be narrowly tailored, district must have
least possible amount of irregularity in shape,
making allowances for traditional districting
criteria.
Questions presented: (1) When state knows
that it is possible to construct reasonably compact
minority opportunity district, within the meaning
of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and
recognizes its obligation to avoid vote dilution,
does Shaw v. Reno require state to abandon all
other districting goals and maximize regularity of
shape of voting rights district? (2) When state's
majority-white congressional districts are highly
irregular in shape, does Shaw require state to
maximize regularity of shape only for its minority
opportunity districts? (3) Are small, functional,
rational, single-urban-area minority opportunity
districts, that unite persons with commonality of
interest, unconstitutional under Shaw? (4) Did
citizens prove elements of equal protection claim
with respect to Texas congressional districts 18,
29. and 30? (5) Does Shaw confer automatic
standing on any state resident who idealizes
colorblind districting?
Appeal filed 11/2/94, by Elaine R. Jones,
Theodore M. Shaw, Penda D. Hair, and NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., all of
Washington, D.C., Charles Drayden, Drayden,
Wyche & Woods, and Lawrence Boz6, all of
Houston, Texas, Anthony E. Chavez, and Mexi-
can American Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, both of Los Angeles, Calif., Kevin Wig-
gins, and White, Hill, Sims & Wiggins, both of
Dallas, Texas, and Carmen Rumbault, and Mexi-
can American Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, both of San Antonio, Texas.
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Al VERA, Bill Calhoun, Edward Chen, Pauline Orcutt, Edward Blum, Kenneth
Powers
and Barbara L. Thomas, Plaintiffs,
V.
Ann RICHARDS, Governor, Bob Bullock, Lt. Governor, Dan Morales, Attorney
General, Pete Laney, Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Ronald
Kirk, Texas Secretary of State, Defendants,





EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 at one blow
demolished the obvious devices that southern states
had used to disenfranchise African-American voters
for decades. The Act marked the full maturity in
American political life of the Founders' idea that "all
men are created equal" and the Rev. Martin Luther
King's hope that his children would be judged by the
content of their character, not the color of their skin.
The meaning of equality-as also enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws"--is the subject of this lawsuit.
It is no longer disputed that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments embody a right to ballot box
equality among American citizens of different races or
ethnic backgrounds. The Fourteenth Amendment also
prohibits government from invidiously classifying
persons because of their race. Repeatedly and in the
strongest terms, the Supreme Court has condemned
intentional racial discr11imiati n by saagt
bodies. Where official discrimination is found to
exist, the burden is on the governmental body to
justify it by no less than a compelling governmental
interest.
In 1991, the State of Texas deliberately redrew its
Congressional boundary lines following the 1990
census with nearly exact knowledge of the racial
makeup of every inhabited block of land in the state.
This insight, worthy of Orwell's Big Brother, was
attainable because computer technology, made
available since the last decennial census,
superimposed at a touch of the keyboard
block-by-block racial census statistics upon the
detailed local maps vital to the redistricting process.
Not only did the state know the precise location of
African-American, Hispanic, and Anglo populations,
but it repeatedly segregated those populations by race
to further the prospects of incumbent officeholders or
to create "majority-minority" Congressional districts.
The result of the Legislature's efforts is House Bill 1
("HB "), a crazy-quilt of districts that more closely
resembles a Modigliani painting than the work of
public-spirited representatives.
The question before this court is whether any of
the 24 challenged Congressional Districts, many of
whose boundaries were clearly affected by racial
considerations, can be sufficiently explained by
legitimate redistricting criteria other than race. For
reasons that follow, we conclude that Congressional
Districts 18, 29, and 30 as presently drawn are not so
explainable. They were conceived for the purpose of
providing "safe" seats in Congress for two
African-American and an Hispanic representatives.
They were scientifically designed to muster a
minimum percentage of the favored minority or ethnic
group; minority numbers are virtually all that
mattered in the shape of those districts. Those
districts consequently bear the odious imprint of racial
apartheid, and districts that intermesh with them are
necessarily racially tainted.
Other challenged Texas Congressional Districts
are disfigured less to favor or disadvantage one race or
ethnic group than to promote the reelection of
incumbents; they are not unconstitutionally
segregated.
We do not hold that the state may only draw
Congressional boundaries with a blind eye toward
race, a goal which would be impossible, nor that it is
altogether prohibited from creating majority-minority
districts. But when the State redraws the boundaries
of Districts 18, 29, and 30 and contiguous districts, it
can and must exhibit respect for neighborhoods,
communities, and political subdivision lines. As the
Supreme Court put it, appearances do matter. In
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appearance and in reality, these three districts were
racially gerrymandered.
IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiffs contend that under Shaw v. Reno and
the Equal Protection Clause, all but six of the State's
Congressional districts are illegally constituted. They
allege that Congressional Districts 18, 29, and 30
owed their extraordinarily odd shapes to an intent to
segregate minority voters. These districts, together
with District 28, will hereinafter be referred to
occasionally as the "voting rights districts." Other
districts in the state, according to the plaintiffs, are the
products of intentional segregation because they split
counties and cities along racial lines to achieve
population balance.
To evaluate these contentions it is necessary first
to review the criteria of a Shaw claim and to weigh
some of the State's general defenses. We then analyze
separately the voting rights districts and the State's
other Congressional Districts that are challenged by
the plaintiffs. The pertinent issues in each instance
are what role race played in the formulation of the
districts and whether the resulting districts' boundaries
are sufficiently explainable on other than racial
grounds. Finally, we consider whether the state had a
compelling justification to segregate voters by race.
The way in which the Court described the nature
of the equal protection claim both places Shaw
squarely in the traditional mode of constitutional
analysis concerning racial classifications and reflects
the Court's sensitivity to the legislative districting
process. For reasons that we shall explain, we do not
agree with the narrow view that Shaw recognizes an
equal protection claim only in such extreme
circumstances of racial gerrymandering that hardly any
such claim will ever be provable....
VWhUat, uell, Uoes Shaw Identify as tle
characteristics of equal protection in the legislative
districting process? The Court accepted the claim of
registered voters in North Carolina that "redistricting
legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face
that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to
segregate the races for purposes of voting, without
regard for traditional districting principles and without
sufficiently compelling justification" is
unconstitutional.
The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
"is to prevent the states from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of
race." Drawing on traditional Fourteenth Amendment
precedent in racial cases, the Court pointed out that
benign or remedial racial classifications are as suspect
as malign discrimination and that among the vices of
racial classifications is their tendency to "stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial
group and to incite racial hostility." State legislation
that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of
their race must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest. These analytical
principles apply not only to legislation that makes
explicit racial distinctions but also to those "rare"
statutes that, although race-neutral, are on their face"
'unexplainable on grounds other than race.' "
The Court agreed with the plaintiff voters'
assertion that if redistricting legislation is so bizarre
on its face "that [it] is 'unexplainable on grounds other
than race,' it demands the same close scrutiny that we
give other state laws that classify citizens by race."
The Court cited voting rights cases to support that
conclusion. Once established, the Court said, a racial
gerrymander should not receive less scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation
classifying citizens by race.
Having connected the constitutional claim
recognized in Shaw to its unbroken line of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court drew on two
voting rights cases and a hypothetical example to
illustrate how to recognize a racial gerrymander.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot represents the "exceptional
case" in which proof of intentional classification is
easy. In Gomillion, the Court illustrated its opinion
with a map of the formerly rectangular shape of
Tuskegee, Alabama, as it had been disfigured by an
"uncouth 28-sided" municipal boundary line that
allegedly fenced out of the city limits all but four or
five of the locality's African-American citizens.
Similarly obvious, Shaw observed, "would be a case
in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority
population in a single district by disregarding
traditional districting principles such as compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions."
Wright and Gomillion represent the two poles of
a potential Shaw claim. From Gomillion, it appears
that bizarrely shaped districts whose boundaries were
created for the purpose of racially segregating voters
are unconstitutional. The Court's hypothetical
example likewise condemns districts that bring
together a dispersed minority population without
regard for traditional districting criteria. If a
majority-minority district reasonably adheres to
objective districting factors, however, as in Wright, no
invidious discrimination exists; that type of district is
justified on its own terms apart from the incidental
factor of race.
Texas asserts two general defenses that, if
accepted, would undermine essential premises behind
Shaw 's definition of unconstitutional race- conscious
redistricting. First, the State asserts that its districts
cannot be unconstitutionally bizarre in shape because
Texas does not have and never has used traditional
redistricting principles such as natural geographical
boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and conformity
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to political subdivisions. Second, the State asserts that
the districts' irregular shapes were caused not by racial
classification of voters in any instance but by the
Congressional delegation's demands, acceded to by
state government, that all incumbent Congressional
officeholders be protected.
It is true that Texas has no constitutional or
statutory constraints on creating legislative districts.
However, the portrait of redistricting history in Texas,
as painted by the state, is inaccurate. From the State's
current perspective, successive generations of Texas
legislators have eschewed tying districts to pesky
constraints like geography, political subdivision
boundaries, compactness, and contiguity. Certainly,
this state's vast layout has undoubtedly made it
difficult to fit Congressional districts perfectly within
single geographic regions. But since 1960, the
principle of assigning at least one Congressional seat
to each major city has been followed, satisfying
obvious geographical and community interests.
More fundamentally, the State describes
incumbent protection as a "state interest" in
redistricting that sufficiently explains otherwise
irregular Congressional district boundaries. There is
again tension between the state's contention and the
facts of this case. For one thing, no more than two or
three incumbent Texas Congressmen were seriously
jeopardized by the Legislature creating more minority
districts. Additionally, never before have districts
been drawn on a block-by-block or neighborhood- or
town-splitting level to corral voters perceived as
sympathetic to incumbents or to exclude opponents of
the incumbents. This form of incumbent protection is
much different in degree from the generalized, and
legitimate, goal of incumbent and seniority protection
previously recognized by the Supreme Court.
It is important to realize that as enacted in Texas
in 1991, many incumbent protection boundaries
sabotaged traditional redistricting principles as they
routinely divided counties, cities, neighborhoods, and
regions. For the sake of maintaining or winning seats
in the House of Representatives, Congressmen or
would-be Congressmen shed hostile groups and
potential opponents by fencing them out of their
districts. The Legislature obligingly carved out
districts of apparent supporters of incumbents, as
suggested by the incumbents, and then added
appendages to connect their residences to those
districts. The final result seems not one in which the
people select their representatives, but in which the
representatives have selected the people.
But in any event, the State's realization of its goal
may not fully undo the traditional principles of
districting that Shaw uses as a benchmark. Shaw
nowhere refers to incumbent protection as a traditional
districting criterion. Shaw acknowledges that
compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions, and like criteria--though not
constitutionally required--are "objective factors" that
may disprove a racial gerrymander claim. To this
extent, Shaw implicitly reaffirms the important
interconnection of community and geography and
effective representative government in drawing its
distinction between those ideal districting criteria and
a racial gerrymander that ignores them. While these
criteria are important in and of themselves, they are
critical to Shaw 's calculus; districts that have no
logical boundaries except those dictated by race are
perceived by voters within and without the districts as
existing solely to afford racial representation.
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry
particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer
matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation
continues to aspire.
Finally, notwithstanding the State's attempts to
minimize their significance, racial data were an
omnipresent ingredient in the redistricting process.
Preparatory to the 1991 legislative session, the
REDAPPL system contained the State's redistricting
maps that were capable of displaying every
neighborhood in the state down to the street and block
level. As soon as they became available following the
1990 census, the racial statistics for each street and
block were coordinated with the REDAPPL system so
that the programmer could display both kinds of
information simultaneously. No other socioeconomic
census data were placed on the computer or available
to the Legislature.
That district lines throughout the state coordinate
very closely with racial population boundaries is
hardly disputed by the state. The plaintiffs' expert
demonstrated on maps of most of the 34 Texas
counties whose boundaries were split among
Congressional districts how closely racial and ethnic
population data were coordinated with the
Congressional boundary lines. In numerous instances,
the correlation between race and district boundaries is
nearly perfect. In the Dallas Metroplex area and the
Harris County area, where three voting rights districts
were created, the racial character of the line-drawing
is manifest. The borders of Districts 18, 29, and 30
change from block to block, from one side of the street
to the other, and traverse streets, bodies of water, and
commercially developed areas in seemingly arbitrary




Shaw explained the nature of a racial
gerrymandering claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Utilizing Shaw 's precepts, the court has
carefully analyzed all of the voluminous evidence
produced by the parties and investigated 24 of Texas'
Congressional Districts. Although the State
indisputably used racial data in the process of
Congressional reapportionment throughout the state,
and it used the data with sophistication and precision,
we conclude that only three Congressional Districts
were unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered.
Districts 18, 29, and 30 were all designed with highly
irregular boundaries that take no heed of traditional Texas Congressional District 18
districting criteria; those districts function primarily to
include sufficient numbers of the favored minority
groups and to exclude the disfavored groups so as to
assure election of one of the favored groups' members.
If these districts--tortuously constructed
block-by-block and from one side of the street to
another across entire counties to satisfy the desired
racial goal-are constitutional, then the State could
more easily hand each voter a racial identification card
and allow him to participate in racially separate
elections. The exclusively racial makeup of these
districts harks back to the infamous "white primary,"
which was constitutionally condemned decades ago.
Surely districts as race-specific as Districts 18, 29,
and 30 have no place in our system of government.
Texas Congressional District 29
Texas Congressional District 30
142
94-923 SHAW v. HUNT
Redistricting-Racial gerrymander-Strict scru-
tiny.
Ruling below (DC ENC, 861 F.Supp. 408, 63
LW 2147):
On remand from Shaw v. Reno, 61 LW 4818
(US SupCt 1993), which held that white plain-
tiffs stated Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion claim by alleging that North Carolina's cre-
ation of two bizarre-shaped, black-majority
congressional districts was so irrational on its face
that it could be understood only as effort to
segregate voters racially into separate voting dis-
tricts, state's concession that desire to create two
black-majority districts was substantial motivat-
ing factor behind enactment of redistricting plan
triggers strict scrutiny, i.e., examination by court
of whether use of race can be justified as narrow-
ly tailored means of furthering compelling state
interest; state had initial burden of producing
evidence that plan's use of race was justified, but
burden of persuasion remained upon plaintiffs
throughout to prove that plan was unconstitution-
al, including burden to disprove any justification
adequately advanced by state; state adequately
established that it had compelling interest in
enacting race-based plan by showing that it had
strong basis in evidence for concluding that plan
was necessary to avoid violation of Section 2 of
Voting Rights Act, given state's earlier legislative
experience with Section 2 challenges to plans and
Justice Department's denial of preclearance of
state's original plan; plan did not create more
black-majority districts than reasonably neces-
sary to comply with Voting Rights Act, and black
majority in each district (50.5 percent and 53.5
percent) was ro' 2reater than reasonably neces-
sary to give black.; -;asonabIe opportunity to elect
representatives of tne:: choice: plan does not
impose rigid quota, but estab-lishes flexible goal
for black representation in state's congressional
delegation of 16.7 percent, which bears reason-
able relation to 22 percent black proportion of
state population; plan does not impose undue
burden on rights of innocent third parties because
it complies with constitutional one person, one
vote requirements, does not unconstitutionally di-
lute voting strength of any identifiable group of
voters, and creates districts that, though highly
irregular in shape and relatively non-compact
geographically, are nonetheless based on rational
districting principles because they achieve high
homogeneity in terms of citizens' material condi-
tions and interests (one district being predomi-
nantly urban and other predominantly rural), and
do not significantly inhibit access to and respon-
siveness of elected representatives via mailings,
local offices, and personal visits; accordingly,
plan is narrowly tailored to further compelling
state interest, and does not violate plaintiffs'
equal protection rights.
Questions presented: (1) Was North Carolina's
racially gerrymandered redistricting plan enacted
without compelling state interest for doing so?
(2) Did state legislature enact North Carolina's
racially gerrymandered redistricting plan without
narrowly tailoring it? (3) Did court below negate
"strict scrutiny" test by misallocating burden of
persuasion, relying on post hoc rationalizations,
and making clearly erroneous findings of fact?
Appeal filed 11/21/94, by Robinson 0. Ever-
ett, of Durham, N.C.
143
94-924 POPE v. HUNT
Redistricting-Racial gerrymander-Geographic
compactness-Burden of proof.
Ruling below (Shaw v. Hunt, DC ENC, 861
F.Supp. 408, 63 LW 2147):
On remand from Shaw v. Reno, 61 LW 4818
(US SupCt 1993), which held that white plain-
tiffs stated Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion claim by alleging that North Carolina's cre-
ation of two bizarre-shaped, black-majority
congressional districts was so irrational on its face
that it could be understood only as effort to
segregate voters racially into separate voting dis-
tricts, state's concession that desire to create two
black-majority districts was substantial motivat-
ing factor behind enactment of redistricting plan
triggers strict scrutiny, i.e., examination by court
of whether use of race can be justified as narrow-
ly tailored means of furthering compelling state
interest; state had initial burden of producing
evidence that plan's use of race was justified, but
burden of persuasion remained upon plaintiffs
throughout to prove that plan was unconstitution-
al, including disproof of any justification ade-
quately advanced by state; state adequately es-
tablished that it had compelling interest in
enacting race-based plan by showing that it had
strong basis in evidence for concluding that race-
based plan was necessary to avoid violation of
Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, given its earlier
legislative experience with Section 2 challenges to
plans and Justice Department's denial of pre-
clearance of state's original plan; plan did not
create more black-majority districts than reason-
ably necessary to comply with Voting Rights Act,
and black majority in each district (50.5 percent
and 53.5 percent) was no greater than reasonably
necessary to give blacks reasonable opportunity to
elect representatives of their choice; plan does not
impose rigid quota, but establishes flexible goal
for black representation in state's congressional
delegation of 16.7 percent, which bears reason-
able relation to 22 percent black proportion of
state population; plan does not impose undue
burden on rights of innocent third parties because
it complies with constitutioral one person, one
vote requirements, does not uncontuIutiona!ly di-
lute voting strength of any identifiable group of
voters, and creates districts that, though highly
irregular in shape and relatively non-compact
geographically, are nonetheless based on rational
districting principles because they achieve high
homogeneity in terms of citizens' material condi-
tions and interests (one district being predomi-
nantly urban and other predominantly rural), and
do not significantly inhibit access to and respon-
siveness of elected representatives via mailings,
local offices, and personal visits; accordingly,
plan is narrowly tailored to further compelling
state interest, and does not violate plaintiffs'
equal protection rights.
Questions presented: (I) Did district court at-
tribute insufficient relevance to configuration of
challenged congressional districts in light of this
court's admonition in Shaw v. Reno that "[r]eap-
portionment is one area in which appearances do
matter"? (2) Did district court err in applying
remedial standard under Section 2 of Voting
Rights Act when redistricting plan in question
was not remedial in nature? (3) Does failure of
North Carolina's congressional redistricting stat-
ute to meet geographic compactness requirements
of Thornburg .v. Ginle 478 U.s. 30 (1986),
vitiate district court's reliance on Section 2 as
compelling state interest? (4) Does district
court's disregard of Gingles compactness require-
ment result in prohibited proportional representa-
tion? (5) Did district court err in failing to shift
burden of proof to state to proffer legitimate,
non-racial explanation for irrationally shaped dis-
tricts in challenged plan?
Appeal filed 11/21/94, by Michael A. Hess, of
Washington, D.C., and Thomas F. Ellis, Thomas
A. Farr, Sean C. Callinicos, Craig D. Mills, and
Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & Adams P.A., all of
Raleigh. N.C.
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HIGH COURT WILL HEAR REMAP CASE
Officials See Confusion for Congressional Races
The Dallas Morning News
Copyright 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
Sam Attlesey
Political Writer of The Dallas Morning News
Austin - The U.S. Supreme Court's decision Thursday
to hear the Texas redistricting case is likely to create
confusion next year for voters, congressional
incumbents and challengers, officials of both parties
said.
They say the ruling could mean that the current
boundaries will be used for the 1996 congressional
races, that a new map could be drawn before the
election or that the congressional primaries could be
delayed.
"My only disappointment is the confusion this
will cause for the 1996 elections," said Houston
businessman Edward Blum, one of six Republicans
who sued over the districts, saying the state drew the
political districts by race.
He said he hopes that the high court, which goes
back into session in October, will rule quickly on
Texas.
Mr. Blum said the court's decision to take up the
case could delay the Jan. 2 deadline for candidates to
file for a spot on the March primary ballot. It also
could postpone the Democratic and GOP primaries for
the state's 30 congressional seats, he said.
Republican Gov. George W. Bush also said he
hopes that the Supreme Court will "conduct this
review promptly."
"I am worried the court's decision to delay its
ruling has the potential to disrupt the 1996
congressional elections in Texas," the governor said.
Deval Patrick, the assistant U.S. attorney general
in charge of civil rights, said he has high hopes the
court will approve the Texas map, which he said
involves political and geographic considerations.
"What the court clearly is doing is struggling
towards the right balance," Mr. Patrick said.
U.S. Rep. Martin Frost, D-Dallas, a redistricting
expert, said he believes that the court's decision will
not change the congressional boundaries or timing of
the 1996 elections.
"The bottom line is that we will be running from
the same districts in 1996," Mr. Frost said.
Other political officials were uncertain.
"It's too early to say what it means for 1996," said
Texas Democratic Party executive director Ed Martin.
"But no one expects a decision until 1996."
Each decade, because of population changes, the
Texas Legislature must redraw state and congressional
political districts.
Some officials said there could be an effort to
come up with an out-of-court settlement between
incumbent congressmen and the GOP plaintiffs who
filed the lawsuit in 1994.
But Mr. Blum, who is also director of a group
called the Campaign for a Color-Blind America, said
he does not favor an out-of-court settlement.
"I don't want to work with congressional
incumbents on drawing congressional districts," he
said.
Mr. Blum said he was confident the high court
will agree with a three-judge federal court panel that
ruled that the district represented by U.S. Rep. Eddie
Bernice Johnson, D-Dallas, and two districts in Harris
County were racially gerrymandered.
The Supreme Court also ruled Thursday in a
Georgia redistricting case that race cannot be the
predominant factor in crafting political boundaries.
Republicans say that race was the key factor in
drawing the three congressional districts in Texas.
Texas Democratic officials have denied that,
saving that protection of incumbents, partisanship and
other factors besides race were used in drawing the
predominantly minority districts.
The Democrats noted that all three districts are
contained mostly in one county as opposed to the
questionable Georgia district that rambles for 260
miles through several counties.
"We believe there are significant factual
differences between the Texas and Georgia
redistricting cases. Otherwise, the court would not
have agreed to review our case," said Texas Attorney
General Dan Morales, a Democrat.
Mr. Blum said his assertions that Texas'
congressional districts were race-based will be upheld.
"It's the same segregation whether it's in one
county or in two or three counties," he said.
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Redistricting officials were also uncertain what
effect the Supreme Court's rulings Thursday will have
on a proposed settlement of a lawsuit contending that
the state's legislative districts were also racially
gerrymandered.
Lawmakers and the same GOP plaintiffs who
challenged the congressional map worked out an
agreement during the legislative session.
The settlement must be approved by a three-judge
federal court panel in Austin. A hearing is scheduled
for July 7.
Mr. Bush said he "signed off on the plan," but
now "I understand there is a concern, and I'm trying to
get to the bottom of what the concern is."
Some Republican legislators have said the
proposed settlement may not be as fair as it should be
to the GOP.
Staff writer David Jackson in Washington
contributed to this report.
146
ASSEMBLY CAN VOTE FOR FAIRER VOTING
The News & Observer Raleigh, NC
Tuesday, May 9, 1995
Lee Mortimer
Durham - As the U.S. Supreme Court prepares to rule
on the constitutionality of election districts drawn to
favor racial minorities, the General Assembly is
considering allowing localities in North Carolina to
experiment with new voting methods that provide fair
minority representation but treat all voters fairly.
Under current law, local governments are
authorized to use districts, at-large, or some
combination for municipal and county elections.
Senate Bill 791 would add three "alternative" methods
-- limited voting, cumulative voting and preference
voting - to the existing menu of options. Democrat
Wib Gulley of Durham has introduced the bill in the
Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, of which Gulley
is chairman, will review the bill today. If it receives a
favorable report, the full Senate is scheduled to vote
on it Thursday. Rep. Shawn Lemmond, a
Mecklenburg County Republican, will sponsor Senate
Bill 791 when it returns to the House. The proposal
had earlier received a unanimous recommendation
from the Election Laws Review Committee.
In the Shaw vs. Hunt case against North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District, the Supreme
Court signaled its disapproval of districts drawn to
favor minority candidates. Limited, cumulative, and
preference voting are forms of proportional
representation (or "PR") that allow minorities to win
seats without creating single-member districts defined
by race.
In a single-member district, one representative is
chosen for all the voters. The problem is that up to 49
percent of voters may have voted against their
"representative." In a proportional election,
representatives are chosen from larger, multi-member
districts. In an election for a five-member county
commission, a racial minority constituting one-fifth of
the electorate could group together behind one
candidate and be assured of winning one of the seats.
Proportional representation comes in several
varieties. In a "party-list" system - used by most
European democracies and Nelson Mandela's South
Africa -- voters cast their ballots for a party's list of
candidates, and seats are awarded according to a
party's percentage of the vote. Limited, cumulative and
preference voting are "semi-proportional" in
comparison to party-list PR. These methods support
the American tradition of voting directly for
candidates.
If five county commissioner seats were up for
election, limited voting would allow voters to cast one
or two votes. "Limiting" the vote to fewer than the
number of members to be elected prevents minority
voters from being overwhelmed by the majority.
Limited voting is already used in Anson, Bladen,
Beaufort, Martin, Perquimans and Sampson counties
and in the towns of Clinton, Benson and Jamesville.
Limited voting allowed these localities to resolve
voting-rights problems without using race-based
districts.
Cumulative voting would allow voters to
distribute their five votes in any combination,
including all votes for one candidate. The system is
used by communities in Alabama, New Mexico and
South Dakota to provide minority representation on
local governing boards. Cumulative voting "plays in
Peoria" to elect the City Council there, and is often
used to elect corporate boards of directors.
With preference voting (also known as the
single-transferable vote), voters rank the candidates in
the order they prefer them (first, second, third, etc.).
In a five-member election, any candidate garnering
one fifth of the top-ranked votes would be elected. If
your favorite candidate has more than enough votes to
win -- or can't win because of too few votes -- your
vote is transferred to help the candidate you like next
best.
Preference voting has significant advantages over
limited or cumulative voting. Minority candidates (or
any similar candidates) can compete without splitting
the vote and defeating each other. Transfers prevent
votes from being "wasted" on candidates who either
don't need them to win or who can't win. Preference
voting encourages cross-racial/coalition voting
because no votes are transferred until after the
higher-ranked candidate has been either elected or
eliminated.
Preference voting has been used successfully by
22 U.S. cities including Cincinnati, Kalamazoo,
Mich., Boulder, Colo., New York City and
Cambridge, Mass. It was part of the municipal reform
movement earlier this century. The goal then was to
curb the power of urban political "bosses." But
preference voting also enabled African-Americans to
get elected decades before that became commonplace.
After many failed attempts, the politicians were able
to get preference voting repealed in most places,
unfortunately sometimes by appeals to racial
prejudice.
The Supreme Court is expected to rule by June on
whether -- or how much -- race can be considered in
drawing election districts. The General Assembly's
decision on alternative election methods will
determine how well local communities will be able to
respond to whatever the high court decides.
Lee Mortimer is a Durham resident and a founding
member of the Center for Voting and Democracy in
Washington, D.C.
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RULING ON REDISTRICTING MAY ALTER SOUTH'S POLITICS
Officials Likely to Form Biracial Coalitions
The News & Observer Raleigh, NC; Tuesday, July 4, 1995
Thomas B. Edsall
The Washington Post
Washington - The Supreme Court's redistricting
decision is likely to change the politics of race,
especially in the South.
Compliance with the court may cost some
African-American representatives their seats, but it
also will force politicians of both races to adopt
biracial coalition strategies, according to Democrats
and Republicans who said that white members of
Congress will have to become more responsive to the
interests of expanded black constituencies.
Few people are more attuned to the conflicting
consequences likely to follow the 5-4 ruling, which
bars the use of race as the "predominant factor" in
congressional districting, than Rep. John Lewis,
D-Ga., whose beating at Selma, Ala., on March 7,
1965, helped galvanize public opinion and win
passage of the original Voting Rights Act.
"The decision goes to the heart of the Voting
Rights Act; it tends to gut the heart of the act itself,"
Lewis said. He and many other black leaders have
voiced concern and anger that the decision will be a
major setback to African-American entry into the
political process.
At the same time, Lewis added, the decision will
put pressure on politicians of both races "to reach out
to build a biracial coalition, to build a biracial base."
The building of political coalitions encompassing
all races "was one of the principles of SNCC [the
Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee] 35
years ago," he said, and "what we want to build is a
true interracial democracy in America."
But, Lewis noted, just 30 years ago most blacks
in the 11th Congressional District of Georgia, which
the Supreme Court rejected Thursday, were barred by
law and intimidation from voting.
"We have not reached the point" of a color-blind
society, he said, so the need for race-conscious
districting continues if blacks are going to be
adequately represented in Congress.
The court ruling effectively declared
unconstitutional the policy of the Bush administration
to force legislatures to create black and Hispanic
districts whenever possible. One result of such
redistricting was to concentrate overwhelmingly
Democratic voters in a few districts, while increasing
Republican strength in surrounding white districts.
[North Carolina's Ist and 12th Congressional
Districts were among those specially created districts,
and the Supreme Court will rehear challenges to them
in the fall.]
Georgia is a case study in the redistricting results.
The state's 11-member delegation is completely
polarized by race, with all eight whites Republican
and all three blacks Democratic.
Scott Falmlen, executive director of the
Democratic Party in Florida, which has two
majority-black districts that could face court
challenges, said that "from a purely political
standpoint, the decision helps Democrats" by
preventing the concentration of overwhelmingly
Democratic black voters into a small number of
districts. But, he said, "from a philosophical
standpoint to make sure all groups have opportunity,
it is clearly a setback."
Like Lewis, Falmlen said the decision may
encourage strategies that recognize "we are in the era
of coalitions." He pointed to the Jacksonville-Duval
County, Fla., sheriff race earlier this year in which a
70 percent white community trending steadily toward
the GOP voted decisively for Nat Glover, a black
Democrat. Part of Glover's campaign was an explicit
rejection of the use of quotas in the hiring practices of
the Jacksonville sheriffs office.
South Carolina's Democratic Party chairman,
Donald Fowler, voiced pessimism that the decision
would help resolve Democratic dilemmas. "Situations
occur where if you draw lines one way, you will
advantage a black Democrat; another way, you will
advantage a white Democrat," he said. "The lack of
clarity in the court's decision could have the result of
intensifying that dilemma."
Steve Anthony, executive director of the Georgia
Democrats, contended that his party can come out
ahead: "I can envision we can still retain and hold the
three seats that are held by the black Democratic
congressmen and pick up anywhere from two to four
additional seats."
He pointed out that the challenged 11th District
of Georgia, represented by Cynthia McKinney, was 64
percent black in 1990, giving Democrats room to
change the lines and still maintain a majority-black
district.
Rusty Paul, chairman of the Georgia Republican
Party, contended that the GOP's growing strength
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among whites, in combination with loosening
Democratic loyalties among younger black voters,
makes him confident that the Republican Party can
withstand redrawn districts.
Whit Ayres, a Republican pollster who
specializes in Southern politics, said racial districting
after the 1990 census "accelerated the Republican
growth, but did not cause the Republican growth."
The likelihood that the court will overturn "some
of these predominantly black districts is not going to
somehow magically resurrect white Democrats across
the South, because many Southerners have now
become comfortable voting Republican and are not
going to go back."
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94-1922 RURAL WEST TENNESSEE AFRI-
CAN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS COUNCIL INC. v.
SUNDQUIST
Reapportionment of state senate-Voting Rights
Act Section 2-Minority voting strength.
Ruling below (DC WTenn, 2/22/95):
Voting strength of blacks, who constitute 14.4
percent of Tennessee's voting age population, is
not diluted in violation of Section 2 of Voting
Rights Act by single-member districting plan for
33-member Tennessee state senate that creates
three districts (9.1 percent of districts) in each of
which blacks comprise over 55 percent of voting
age population and three additional, "influence"
districts in which blacks comprise roughly one-
third of voting age population; although all three
preconditions required by Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986), for finding Section 2 viola-
tion are satisfied in this case, "totality of circum-
stances" analysis, which must include consider-
ation of influence districts, requires conclusion
that Section 2 is not violated by Tennessee state
senate districting plan; Voting Rights Act Section
2 does not require proportionality linking number
of districts in which minority group has voting
age majority to that group's share of relevant
population.
Questions presented: (I) When court reviewing
state's legislative redistricting plan finds that pre-
requisites under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986), for violation of Section 2 of Voting
Rights Act have been established and that plan
denies minority voters opportunity to elect candi-
dates of their choice, may court deny remedy to
these voters on ground that they are (in theory)
sufficiently numerous in some districts to "influ-
ence" election outcomes? (2) When minority vot-
ers satisfy Gingles prerequisites, did district court
err in refusing to consider total population in
determining whether redistricting plan fairly re-
flects minority voting strength when state used
total population to determine district size, when
state concedes that minority voters were under-
counted by census compared to whites, and when
white bloc voting against minority candidates is
particularly pervasive and severe?
Appeal filed 5/22/95, by Laughlin McDonald,
Neil Bradley, Mary Wyckoff, Maha Zaki, and
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc.,
all of Atlanta, Ga., Bruce Kramer, Borod &
Kramer, and ACLU Foundation of Tennessee
Inc., all of Memphis, Tenn., Richard Dinkins,
and Williams and Dinkips, both of Nashville,
Tenn., and Keenan R. Keller, and Davis Polk &
Wardwell, both of New York, N.Y.
94-1941 U.S. v. VIRGINIA
Single-gender education at state schools-Equal
protection.
Ruling below (CA 4, 44 F.3d 1229, 63 LW
2470):
State's provision of single-gender military col-
lege education to men and single-gender college
education with special leadership training to
women, which is based on difference in gender
but is otherwise comparable, does not violate
Equal Protection Clause.
Questions presented: (1) Can state that pro-
vides rigorous military-style public educational
program for men remedy unconstitutional denial
of same opportunity to women by offering them
different type of single-sex educational program
deemed more suited to average woman? (2) Is co-
education required remedy in context of this
case?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/26/95, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Deval L. Patrick, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Paul Bender, Dpty. Sol. Gen., Corne-
lia T.L. Pillard, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and Jessica
Dunsay Silver and Thomas E. Chandler, Justice
Dept. Attys.
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
George F. Allen, Governor, of the Commonwealth of Virginia;
Virginia Military Institute
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
44 F.3d 1229
Decided Jan. 26, 1995.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
At issue is the important question of whether a
state may sponsor single-gender education without
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
we concluded that single-gender education was
"pedagogically justifiable," and the United States has
acknowledged in this case that state sponsorship of
single-gender education, if provided to both genders,
is not per se a denial of equal protection. Even though
single-gender college education yields benefits to both
genders, it nevertheless has the secondary effect of
excluding men from the women's college and women
from the men's college, an effect that becomes yet
more complicated when the programs at the two
colleges differ to some degree.
We must decide now whether the Commonwealth
of Virginia's proposal (1) to continue to provide a
single-gender military-type college education for men
at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), (2) to
provide, beginning in 1995, a single-gender education
with special leadership training for women at Mary
Baldwin College, and (3) to continue to provide other
forms of college education, including military training,
for both men and women at other colleges and
universities in the state is constitutionally permissible.
After applying a heightened intermediate scrutiny test
specially tailored to the circumstances before us and
imposing specific performance criteria on the
implementation of Virginia's proposal, we affirm the
district court's judgment approving the proposal.
I
VMI, established by the Commonwealth of
Virginia in 1839 as a four-year military college, has a
current enrollment of approximately 1,300 men. The
college has always admitted only males and, through
an adversative military-type training, it seeks to
graduate them as "'citizen-soldiers, educated and
honorable men who are suited for leadership in
civilian life and who can provide military leadership
when necessary.'" In VMI I, we affirmed the district
court's factual findings, based on studies in evidence,
that such a single-gender education is pedagogically
justifiable, both for males and females. We
concluded: "It is not the maleness, as distinguished
from femaleness, that provides justification for the
program. It is the homogeneity of gender in the
process, regardless of which sex is considered, that
has been shown to be related to the essence of the
education and training at VMI."
We also affirmed findings of fact that coeducation
would destroy aspects of VMI's program which lie
near the core of its holistic system and that the
admission of women therefore would deny them the
very benefit they sought by their admission. The
district court found that coeducation would require
fundamental changes (1) to the adversative method
which pits male against male because that method
would not produce the same results when a male is set
against a female; (2) to the absence of privacy which
was found to be essential to the leveling process; and
(3) to physical training, requiring VMI to adopt, as
was required at the U.S. military academies, a
dual-track program for men and women in order to
achieve equality in effect. We concluded that
coeducation at VMI would thus "deny those women
the very opportunity they sought because the unique
characteristics of VMI's program would be destroyed
by coeducation. The Catch-22 is that women are
denied the opportunity when excluded from VMI and
cannot be given the opportunity by admitting them,
because the change caused by their admission would
destroy the opportunity."
In view of these findings, we did not direct the
Commonwealth of Virginia to change VMI to a
coeducational college, but we did find that its failure
to offer women comparable benefits constituted a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We remanded the case to the
district court, directing it to require Virginia and the
other defendants to formulate, adopt, and oversee the
implementation of a remedial plan. In giving Virginia
the opportunity to select its course to correct the
Fourteenth Amendment violations, we did not suggest
any particular remedy, but allowed that Virginia might
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properly decide to alter the program and admit women
to VMI, or establish parallel institutions or parallel
programs, or abandon state support, leaving VMI the
option to pursue its own policies as a private
institution.
On remand, Virginia designed a proposal to
implement a parallel program at Mary Baldwin
College providing women with single-gender
education, coupled with special leadership training.
Following a trial on the appropriateness of the
remedy, the district court approved the plan and
directed Virginia "to proceed with all deliberate speed
in implementing the Plan and to have the Plan
operational for the academic year commencing in the
Fall of 1995." The court retained jurisdiction to
supervise implementation of the plan and required a
status report every six months.
The plan approved by the district court provides
for Virginia to establish with state funds the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as part of
the undergraduate program at the otherwise privately
funded Mary Baldwin College, a women's liberal arts
college founded in 1842 in Staunton, Virginia, about
35 miles from VMI. The plan is the product of a task
force, chaired by Dr. James D. Lott, Dean of Mary
Baldwin College, which set as its goal the task of
designing a program at Mary Baldwin College to
produce "citizen-soldiers who are educated and
honorable women, prepared for varied work of civil
life, qualified to serve in the armed forces, imbued
with love of learning, confident in the functions and
attitudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense of
public service." Because its mission is similar to
VMI's mission, VWIL would have its students pursue
the same five goals as those pursued at VMI:
education, military training, mental and physical
discipline, character development, and leadership
development. In designing the program at Mary
Baldwin College, however, the task force concluded
that aspects of VMI's military model, especially the
adversative method, would not be effective for women
as a erouo. even though the task force concluded that
some women would be suited to and interested in
experiencing a "women's VMI." The task force
concluded instead that its mission and goals could
better be achieved by designing a program which
deemphasized the military methods associated with
the "rat line," utilizing instead a structured
environment emphasizing leadership training.
In addition to the standard bachelor of arts
program offered at Mary Baldwin College, VWIL
students would be required to complete, as a "minor,"
core and elective courses in leadership. A student in
the VWIL program would be required to take courses
in leadership communications; theories of leadership;
ethics, community, and leadership; and a leadership
seminar or semester of independent research on a topic
relevant to women and leadership. Students would
also be required to participate in Saturday seminars
sponsored by upperclass students on designated
subjects. Outside of the classroom, students would be
required to complete a leadership externship during
which they would work off campus in the public or
private sector for up to one semester and to participate
in a speaker series in which each VWIL class would
be responsible for bringing outstanding leaders to
speak on campus. Finally, all VWIL students would
be required to organize and carry out community
service projects.
While students at VWIL would be required to
participate in four years of ROTC and in an ROTC
summer camp, VWIL would not be organized under
the pervasive military regimen that exists at VMI.
Nevertheless, in addition to standard ROTC training,
the students would conduct "leadership laboratory
activities" which might incorporate aspects of military
training, and they would participate in a
newly-established Virginia Corps of Cadets, a
uniformed military corps comprised of the all-female
VWIL, the all-male VMI, and the coeducational
Virginia Tech ROTC corps. The Virginia Corps of
Cadets would be largely ceremonial.
Finally, VWIL students would be required to take
and pass eight semesters of physical education, a
portion of which would be devoted to health education
courses. These programs would include athletics,
physical training and a "cooperative confidence
building program" to be held twice a week.
The VWIL program would be implemented at
Mary Baldwin College with its faculty, although VMI
faculty would conduct some ROTC training and teach
some ROTC courses at Mary Baldwin College. The
program would be funded by the Commonwealth of
Virginia, providing a per student payment equal to the
current annual appropriation paid per cadet at VMI.
The program, which task force members expect would
have about 25 to 30 students in the first year, would
also be given a permanent endowment of $5.46
million. The out-of-pocket expenses for students to
attend VWIL is expected to be no greater than those
of students attending VMI, and VWIL students would
'e eligible for the same financial aid programs as are
available to VMI cadets.
The experts for both sides acknowledge that the
proposed VWIL program differs from VMI in
methodology since VWIL would not rely on the
pervasive military life and adversative methods to
achieve its goals. Members of the task force, who are
professionals in education, testified that the different
approach was selected principally to address the
different educational needs of most women. Dr.
Heather Anne Wilson, a member of the task force,
summarized the thinking, stating that "the VMI model
is based on the premise that young men come with
[an] inflated sense of self-efficacy that must [be]
knocked down and rebuilt. ... What [women] need is
a system that builds their sense of self- efficacy
through meeting challenges, developing
self-discipline, meeting rigor and dealing with it, and
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having successes." Mary Baldwin College, which
participated actively in the design of the VWIL
program, observed in its amicus brief regarding the
differences between the methodology used at VMI and
that proposed for VWIL: It would have been possible
to design the VWIL program to more closely resemble
VMI, with identical physical fitness standards and
adversative techniques associated with the rat line.
Such a program would have been easier to design and
to defend against the arguments raised by the
government and its amici. But it would have been a
paper program, with no real prospect of successful
implementation. [Mary Baldwin College] believes it
would be professionally irresponsible to compromise
student welfare by designing a program to meet
litigation objectives instead of student needs.
While the task force did not conduct any scientific
survey on demand for the proposed VWIL program,
or alternatively for a women's VMI, several members
expressed the opinion, based on some field data, that
demand would be "significant" for VWIL but not for
a women's VMI, and some expressed doubt that
enough women would be interested in a women's VMI
to make it work.
II
The United States contends that the remedial
program offered by the Commonwealth of Virginia
does not meet the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It states that
"[the proposed remedy] does not correct the
constitutional violation, i.e., the denial to women of
VMI's unique educational methodology. As the
district court recognized, the program 'differs
substantially from the educational program offered at
VMI." At oral argument the United States argued that
any parallel program would have to be "identical" in
substance and methodology to that of VMI. The
United States maintains further that by not offering
coeducation at VMI, the Commonwealth of Virginia
is relying on false stereotypes and generalizations
"that women are not tough enough to succeed in
vMIvs rigorous, military-style program." AS the
United States summarized its position: [The fact
remains that men have [this] special educational
opportunity available to them and women do not, and
that as a result VMI graduates have been very
successful in both public and private careers. This
suit was brought on behalf of those women who want
to go to VMI precisely because it is such a demanding
and challenging school. The remedial plan approved
by the district court does nothing for them. The United
States urges that we enter an order directing Virginia
to admit women to VMI as the only remedy for
correcting the past constitutional violation.
III
Equal protection of the law requires that persons
similarly circumstanced be treated alike, but equal
protection does not deny states the power "to treat
different classes of persons in different ways." When
the state classifies by defining a group to whom a
regulation applies or a benefit is conferred, the
classification "'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. . . .' " In striking down a state statute that
preferred males over females as administrators of wills
in order to further governmental efficiency, the Court
provided the seed for the formulation of a test utilizing
an intermediate level of scrutiny for state regulations
that classify by gender. While Reed implicitly applied
a heightened level of scrutiny, the formulation of this
standard came later. As this test has finally been
articulated, to withstand this level of scrutiny,
"classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."
[U]nder the intermediate level of scrutiny of a
statute or program that classifies by gender, the
analysis begins with the limited inquiry into whether
the state objective is both consistent with a legitimate
governmental role and important in serving that role.
Thereafter it must shift to an inquiry of heightened
scrutiny into whether the classification "substantially
and directly furthers" that objective.
Application of this traditional test, however, to a
case where the classification is not directed per se at
men or women, but at homogeneity of gender, presents
a unique problem, because once the state's objective
is found to be an important one, the classification by
gender is by definition necessary for accomplishing
the objective and might thereby bypass any equal
protection scrutiny. The second prong of the test thus
would provide little or no scrutiny of the effect of a
classification directed at homogeneity of gender. Thus,
in order to measure the legitimacy of a classification
based on homogeneity of gender against the Equal
Protection Clause, we conclude that we must take the
additional step of carefully weighing the alternatives
available to members of each gender denied benefits
by the classification.
To achieve the equality of treatment demanded by
the Equal Protection Clause, the alternatives left
available to each gender by a classification based on
a homogeneity of gender need not be the same, but
they must be substantively comparable so that, in the
end, we cannot conclude that the value of the benefits
provided by the state to one gender tends, by
comparison to the benefits provided to the other, to
lessen the dignity, respect, or societal regard of the
other gender. We will call this third step an inquiry
into the substantive comparability of the mutually
exclusive programs provided to men and women.
Therefore, in this case we will examine a
state-sponsored educational scheme offered by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, under which the state
provides a single-gender military-type college
education to men and a single-gender college
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education with special leadership training to women,
and determine (1) whether the state's objective of
providing single-gender education to its citizens may
be considered a legitimate and important
governmental objective; (2) whether the gender
classification adopted is directly and substantially
related to that purpose; and (3) whether the resulting
mutual exclusion of women and men from each other's
institutions leaves open opportunities for those
excluded to obtain substantively comparable benefits
at their institution or through other means offered by
the state. This is the special intermediate scrutiny test
that we shall apply in deciding this case.
IV
Turning to Virginia's proposed VWIL program,
we begin with the first part of the test and inquire into
whether single-gender education constitutes a
legitimate and important governmental objective,
remembering that deference is to be accorded the
state's legislative will so long as the purpose is not
pernicious and does not violate traditional notions of
the role of government.
Turning to this case, providing the option of a
single-gender college education may be considered a
legitimate and important aspect of a public system of
higher education. That single-gender education at the
college level is beneficial to both sexes is a fact
established in this case. Indeed, the briefs submitted
in this case by the parties and amici curiae list a
multitude of professional articles describing the
benefits of single-gender education, especially for late
adolescents coming out of high school. This should
not be surprising in light of common experience that
a sex-neutral atmosphere can be less distracting to late
adolescents in an educational setting where the focus
is properly on matters other than relationships
between the sexes. Moreover, it is not surprising that
the public, increasingly seeking admission to
single-gender colleges, finds this objective to be
important.
Just as a state's provision of publicly financed
education to its citizens is a legitimate and important
governmental objective, so too is a state's opting for
single-gender education as one particular pedagogical
technique among many. Although there remains some
disagreement among the experts about the extent of
the benefits of single-gender education, it is not our
role to resolve that issue. It is enough that there is a
growing consensus in the professional community that
a sexually homogeneous environment yields concrete
educational benefits. Thus, we should defer to a
state's selection of educational techniques when we
conclude, as we do here, that the purpose of providing
single-gender education is not pernicious and falls
within the range of the traditional govenumental
objective of providing citizens higher education.
Accordingly, we conclude that Virginia has met the
first part of our intermediate scrutiny test.
V
When applying the special intermediate scrutiny
test for classifications based on homogeneity of gender
in the context of higher education, we next consider
whether that classification is substantially related to
the state's purpose. When combined with the third part
of the test, i.e., the inquiry into whether excluded men
and women have opportunities to obtain substantively
comparable benefits, this inquiry scrutinizes the
means by which the state chooses to obtain its
objective.
Single-gender education provides an educational
environment in which the student population is of one
sex, providing the assumed benefit that those students
are not distracted by the presence of the other sex.
Even though it may be offered to both genders through
separate institutions, separate campuses, or even
separate classrooms, a single-gender educational
program necessarily excludes members of the gender
not included in that institution, campus, or classroom.
The importance of the classification is not the fact that
the student body is male or female, but that it is of the
same gender, whichever is chosen for the particular
program. But the only way to realize the benefits of
homogeneity of gender is to limit admission to one
gender. Thus, the means of classifying by gender are
focused on the single-gender educational purpose as
directly as the nature of the objective allows.
While we are satisfied that a classification for
homogeneity of gender is necessary to provide
single-gender education, at whatever level of
separation, we must nevertheless, under the special
intermediate scrutiny test that we are applying for such
classification, be satisfied that both excluded men and
excluded women have reasonable opportunities to
obtain benefits substantively comparable to those they
are denied. That brings us to the final inquiry of this
itermediate scrutiny test.
VII
Were Virginia now building its higher
educational program from the ground up and, as part
of it, offering bachelor's programs (1) at a male-only
institution featuring a highly disciplined military
environment, (2) at a female-only institution featuring
a highly disciplined leadership program in a
non-military environment, and (3) at a third institution
offering a broad array of subjects and methods in a
coeducational environment, our analysis would end
here with approval of the program against an equal
protection challenge.
In this case, however, there is an added element
created by the presence now of VMI as an ongoing
and successful institution with a long history and the
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absence now of a comparable single-gender women's
institution. Virginia's proposal for Mary Baldwin
College is just that--a proposal. Virginia has
undertaken what appears to be a serious effort at
developing a plan to meet this historic deficiency.
Virginia appointed a task force of professionals to
design a new program, designed a program aimed at
special leadership for women, and funded the
proposed program at the same per capita levels at
which it funds VMI. In addition, governmental
officials in Virginia seem to be supporting the new
program at every level. In our earlier opinion we noted
some ambivalence in that regard. Then-Governor
Douglas Wilder had favored coeducation at VMI in
the face of no other alternative, and state education
officials favored a separate program, or some other
course, leading the state, as a party, to bow out of the
liability phase of the litigation as a house divided.
Governor Wilder is now firmly behind the VWIL
program as is current Governor George Allen.
Moreover, the Virginia legislature has supported the
program by providing what appears to be adequate
funding and by promising to increase the level of
funding, should the response require it.
Nevertheless, a state's response to a court ordered
correction of a Fourteenth Amendment violation is
given under command and therefore must be viewed
with some skepticism. While the court was assured at
oral argument that the program proposed at Mary
Baldwin College was serious and had the full support
of the state, the important question remains whether
Virginia will implement the program with the
intensity and perseverance necessary to provide a
substantively comparable opportunity for women, so
that when VWIL is established we will not conclude
that the value of the benefits provided by that
program, when compared to VMI, tends "to lessen the
dignity, respect, or societal regard" of women. To
allay any skepticism and assure eradication of the
constitutional violation, we therefore find it essential,
during the early stage of VWIL's history, to be assured
affirmatively that a high level of state support
continues.
Accordingly, while we affirm the judgment of the
district court, which has issued an injunction
mandating implementation of the plan and retaining
jurisdiction to oversee the implementation, we are
remanding the case with instructions that the court
include, as part of its oversight of the plan's
implementation, a specific review to ensure that
(1) the program is headed by a well-qualified,
motivated administrator, attracted by a level of
compensation suited for the position; (2) the program
is well-promoted to potentially qualified candidates;
(3) the program includes a commitment for adequate
funding by the state for the near term; and (4) the
program includes a mechanism for continuing review
by qualified professional educators so that its elements
may be adjusted as necessary to keep the program
aimed not only at providing a quality bachelor's
degree but also at affording the additional element of
taught discipline and leadership training for women.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I would hold that the proposed remedial plan
fails, as did the policy rejected in VMI I, to pass equal
protection muster under the appropriate intermediate
level of scrutiny. Accordingly, I would reject the plan,
declare the VMI men-only policy still in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, and order that the
violation be ended either by abandoning the policy or
by foregoing further state support for the institution.
I
Though the legal framework is well known and
the general historical background of this litigation is
not in dispute, a brief summary is needed to aid in
identifying the exact constitutional issue that is now
before us.
It was this intermediate level of scrutiny that we
applied in VMI I in holding the original male-only
policy violative of equal protection. That holding still
stands. Unless and until it is overruled, the original
policy - which still remains in effect - remains
unconstitutional. The district court's decision that we
now review does not of course purport to hold
otherwise. It assumes, as it must, the continuing
unconstitutionality of that policy, but holds that the
violation may be effectively remedied by the state's
compliance with the injunctive decree entered by the
court in adopting the state's proposed "parallel
program" plan for women only at Mary Baldwin.
Several important things emerge from those
developments. The first is that the remedial plan
proposed by the Commonwealth and adopted as
remedy by the district court simply involves a new
gender-classification which now has become the
proper subject of the heightened scrutiny mandated by
Craig and its progeny.
The next point of importance is that this new
gender-classification (in its projected form) is of a
type that has not yet been definitively subjected to
equal protection scrutiny: it involves a state's
provision of separate single-gender educational
institutions for men and women which it is claimed
will meet equal protection requirements by providing
substantially equal, though separately administered,
benefits. This could raise a threshold question
whether separate state-supported educational facilities
for men and women, like those for white and black
students, are so "inherently unequal," by reason of
their stigmatic implications, that the new classification
violates equal protection per se and warrants no
further scrutiny.
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If the answer to that threshold question is,
however, "no", so that intermediate scrutiny must
proceed in detail, a final point of importance about the
new classification must be faced. It is that one of the
two critical elements in its separate-but-equal
arrangement, the women-only program at Mary
Baldwin, is only a plan and not a present reality. This
creates a difficult problem for Equal Protection
analysis. Must we assume, without question, that the
stated goals of the women's program are actually
achievable and that the fact of their achievement is
subject to judicial verification when it occurs, so that
we should, on that assumption, (though conditionally)
assess the plan in its proposed ultimate form? Or may
we, in intermediate scrutiny, question either or both
the achievability of the program's stated objectives
and the ability of the courts effectively to assess their
achievement? If we undertake conditional assessment
of the plan on the stated assumption, what is the
proper equal protection test for allowable
separate-but-equal state-supported educational
institutions? What is the proper measure of equality
for that purpose?
Each of these inescapable problems raises for us
issues of first impression in application of equal
protection jurisprudence to the resolution of this case.
II
The logical first question is whether separate
single-gender undergraduate educational facilities for
men and women are "inherently unequal" so that the
proposed plan, even if perfectly realized in time,
would be per se violative of equal protection. Cf id.
The question has not been addressed by the Supreme
Court, see Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n. 1, or by this
court, hence is an open one. Under the disposition I
believe proper, it could remain open, for I would
decline to address it, and hold that even if some
separate-but-equal arrangement might pass equal
protection muster, the one here proposed would not.
The inplication of all this is, as I realize, a stark
one. No separate single-gender arrangement that
involved VMI as the all-mens' school and any
newly-founded separate institution (whether
free-standing or an appendage) as the all womens'
component could pass equal protection muster. It
could not provide substantially equal educational
benefits or opportunities to both genders.
This may be most obvious when the proposed
arrangement is tested for fit against the
"system-diversity" and "intrinsic value" objectives.
The "gender- adopted leadership training" objective
poses a slightly different problem. The benefit upon
which it concentrates is a projected outcome: that of
being one especially suited for military and civilian
leadership by virtue of training adapted to different
gender-characteristics, as "citizen-soldier."
As to this particular objective, I will close by
noting a process reservation beyond the substantive
concerns for achieving substantial equality of the
outcome goal. It seems to me too amorphous an
objective to permit any principled judicial assessment
as the VWIL program is expected to evolve. When
can it first be assessed? Surely not earlier than the
four years it will take to produce the first graduate
presumably trained for that special leadership role.
Must it not actually await an additional period for
putting the training to test in the military and civilian
domains? How will it be assessed even then: by
comparing, on a proportional basis, the actual
leadership positions achieved by graduates of the two
schools? My pessimistic assessment is that one of
two things will occur. One, this particular
governmental objective-- actually a critical one as
advanced--will simply be allowed to fall out of sight
in the judicial monitoring of results that is projected.
Two, its attempted monitoring will generate an
absolute quagmire of conflicting contentions about
achievement of the objective.
It will not work.
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VMI AND THE DEATH OF SINGLE-SEX STUDY
The Washington Times
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, April 12, 1995
Kristin Caplice
The Justice Department will soon announce a
decision that will send a clear signal about the Clinton
administration's commitment to education.
April 26 is the deadline for the department to
decide whether to petition the U.S. Supreme Court to
review a recent ruling in the Fourth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals that upheld the state-supported,
all-female Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL). VWIL, a new undergraduate program at
Mary Baldwin College, was consciously designed as
a complement to the all-male Virginia Military
Institute (VMI).
If the department proceeds against VWIL as
expected, its battle cry undoubtedly will be that
"separate but equal" education was laid to rest over 40
years ago when the Supreme Court decided Brown vs.
Board of Education. Before being seduced by such
sophistry, however, there are a few things Attorney
General Janet Reno should keep in mind.
First, the prohibition against "separate but equal"
treatment has never applied to gender. Gender-based
distinctions are permissible under the Constitution;
race-based distinctions are not. This is because race
and gender are fundamentally different. While there
are legitimate differences between the sexes, there are
not relevant differences between the races. For
example, we accept single-sex sports teams in public
schools, but not single-race teams. Similarly, we
instinctively cringe at the notion of separate
bathrooms for the races, but not at the existence of
men's and women's rooms.
In addition, separating the sexes in education does
not carry the same stigma that race segregation did
because women have the choice of attending a
single-sex school as an alternative to coeducation,
while black students were categorically denied all
options except black schools. Because existing school
systems are almost entirely coeducational, the
single-sex alternative is simply one selection added to
a menu of educational options. With all the
hand-wringing going on, it is easy to forget that this
entire debate is being played out against a backdrop of
coeducation. Because there are only 94 single-sex
colleges in the country, it is not as if single-sex
education is threatening to replace coeducation.
Indeed, this extreme would be just as unacceptable as
the repetitive conformity of a wholly coeducational
system. A choice is all that's sought.
Second, the success of separating the sexes in
education is well-documented, from elementary school
classrooms to colleges. While the ideal education
system would be designed exclusively for each
individual, given limited resources, the most effective
way to approach this ideal is by making general
classifications based on average needs. Because
developmental and learning differences are in part a
function of gender, classification by sex is one way to
group individuals according to their particular
educational needs. In single-sex environments,
professors are at liberty to concentrate on the methods
of instruction that work best for each gender; students
are freed from playing the "mating game" that
frequently accompanies coeducation.
Third, a defeat of VWIL is a defeat for single-sex
education in general. One argument against VWIL
and VMI is that they receive public money and,
therefore, they should be barred from implementing
exclusionary policies. This is state-sanctioned
discrimination, the argument goes. The flaw in this
contention is that virtually all private schools receive
some amount of public assistance. For example, the
Tuition Assistance Grant Act earmarks funds from
Virginia's coffers to benefit students attending private
colleges in Virginia. Some estimate that private
single-sex colleges receive about 20 percent of their
operating expenses from public money in the form of
direct tuition assistance, federal grants, tax
exemptions, work-study programs or scholarships.
If the simple existence of public support were
enough to defeat a single-sex admissions policy, then
all single-sex colleges would have to close their doors
tomorrow. If it is not the existence but some degree of
public support, the question becomes this: How many
public dollars does it take to render single-sex
education unacceptable? When a state like Virginia
endeavors to move forward with an educational reform
that benefits both its men and its women, the origin of
the funds allocated should not constitute a barrier to
the state's initiative.
Fourth, all educational facilities should not have
to be identical. The Justice Department condemns
VWIL because it differs from VMI. Of course it is
different; the program was designed for the way
women learn and interact with others. By their very
nature, schools designed for the special needs of
women will be "different" from schools designed for
the special needs of men. Unless we tear down every
existing school and erect a bland series of exact
educational replicas, each new school identically
mirroring the last, there will always be differences
between schools that cannot, and should not, be
157
adjudicated away. Yet, because VMI offers its
graduates something unique - its reputation, its
facilities, its network - it is assailed by the Justice
Department. The department's dubious logic would
require the elimination of anything unique a school
had to offer. Accordingly, a school would have to be
profoundly unremarkable to be given the department's
stamp of approval - an interesting strategy for
combating mediocrity in American education.
Those who oppose public single-sex education as
an alternative to coeducation would deprive countless
individuals of freedom of educational choice,
including those who desire the benefits of single-sex
education but who cannot afford private-school
tuition. What is worse, these opponents would do so
not because they are being forced into the experience,
but because they do not want others to enjoy the
option.
With a public all-female military school, a public
all-male military school, 40 four-year coeducational
public colleges, 25 two-year coeducational colleges,
one private all-male college and five private all-female
colleges, Virginia is the most educationally diverse
state in the Union. Miss Reno and the Justice
Department should be giving Virginia a standing
ovation rather than crafting new ways to pull the rug
out from under its educational innovations
One of our nation's two remaining public
single-sex women's colleges, Texas Women's
University, recently bowed to the kind of pressure the
Justice Department is putting on VWIL. By opening
its doors to men, it marked the end of a remarkable era
in women's education. Other schools, all-male and
all-female alike, should be encouraged to fight the
Justice Department's senseless rush to conformity.
Kristin Caplice is a student at Harvard Law
School.
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FINDING THE SEXES ARE NOT FUNGIBLE
The Washington Times
Copyright 1995
Friday, February 10, 1995
Bruce Fein
If the law supposes men and women are fungible,
Mr. Bumble would have quipped, the law is an ass, an
idiot.
Last month the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
escaped that reproach by upholding the
constitutionality of single sex military training offered
by the State of Virginia. Writing for a 2-1 panel
majority in United States vs. Virginia (Jan. 26,
1995), Judge Paul Niemeyer denied that the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment compelled
a homogeneity of military instruction irrespective of
gender. To hold otherwise would make the law blind
to what everyone can see: namely, that female youths
unlike their male counterparts find constant physical
and mental pumelling and unclothed grossness
pedagogically unrewarding and psychological
uninspiring. Even the hoyden Joe in "Little Women"
would have recoiled at training and bivouacking with
the likes of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn.
The case originated in a constitutional attack on
Virginia's exclusively male Virginia Military Institute
without any corresponding military-oriented collegiate
experience for females. The 4th Circuit held such
discrimination affronted the equal protection
imperative of the 14th Amendment, but declined to
direct VMI to admit females. It opined that equal
protection might also be satisfied with an exclusively
female training institution tailored to innate gender,
physical, emotional and psychological differences.
Virginia endeavored to meet that latter option
with a special leadership training program for women
at Mary Baldwin College, to commence this year.
Styled the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership,
the program would pursue the same five goals as those
sought at VMI: education, military training, mental
and physical discipline, character development and
leadership development.
Sandwiched into Mary Baldwin's undergraduate
program, VWIL would require enrollees to "minor" in
core courses in leadership, participate in four years of
ROTC and in an ROTC summer camp, and pass eight
semesters of physical education, including physical
training. The VWIL program would be implemented
with Mary Baldwin faculty, although VMI faculty
would conduct some ROTC training and teaching at
Mary Baldwin premises. Its funding per cadet from
the state would be identical to that of VMI, and its
contemplated first year class is estimated at 25 to 30.
The VWIL program would not pivot on the
pervasive military life and gladiatorial methods that
earmark VMI. A female educational professional
testified that the latter responds to the inflated sense of
self-efficacy characteristic of young VMI entrants that
must be deflated and rebuilt with ruthlessness. In
contrast, she maintained "What [women] need is a
system that builds their sense of self-efficacy through
meeting challenges, developing self-discipline,
meeting rigor and dealing with it, and have
successes." Screaming, deriding and physical
nastiness and roughness are counterproductive for
female devlopment.
Judge Neimeyer stressed that the option of
single-sex education is beneficial to both sexes.
Coeduction for many adolescents is too sexually
arousing or emotionally tumultuous for genuine
scholarship. And studies show that many female
adolescents find coeducation an unpleasant retardant
to achieving their full potential.
Gender homogeneity at VMI and at VWIL were
indispensable to attaining the unique benefits of
single-sex training and instruction. Thus, as Judge
Neimeyer explained, VMI's adversative method
answered uniquely feral attributes of young males:
"[It] was not designed to exclude women, but seized
on the possibility, in a sexually homogeneous
environment, of grating egos and setting the
aggressivness of one person against another through
conflict, egalitariansim, lack of privacy, and stress -
both physical and mental .... [It] is intended to break
down individualism and to instill the uniform values
espoused by the institution." But these methods
would be repugnant in coeducational settings, Judge
Neimeyer acknowledged: "If we were to place men
and women into the adversative relationship inherent
in the VMI program, we would destroy ... any sense of
decency that still permeates the relationship between
the sexes."
The VWIL program would offer females
opportunities virtually equivalent to those offered
males at VMI. Their missions and goals are echoes.
Their pedagogies are discrepant only because setting
women against women with the intent of battering
individual spirit and instilling values is demoralizing
and stunting, unlike the responses of many males.
There may be freakish exceptions (although even the
flint-hearted Lady Macbeth left the dirty work to her
husband), but the Constitution does not require the
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government to accommodate every speculation of
fevered imaginations.
The dissent complained that VMI graduates enjoy
a prestige and supportive alumni network to further
their professional aspirations that would be denied
VWIL graduates. Before VWIL has time to establish
a stellar reputation and graduate enrollees that
disparity is inevitable, not invidious; further, its
pioneer students are likely to garner offsetting kudos
and respect in the community because enrollment,
without more, would be an earmark of moxie and
indomitability.
Judge Niemeyer's decision does not leave either
men or women who covet coeducational military
training out in the cold. It is available both at United
States military academies and at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
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94-1876 MAUK v. ENGLE
Foster children-Adoption-Parent and child of
different races.
Ruling below (In re Adoption/Guardianship
No. 2633, Md CtSpecApp, 101 Md.App. 274,
646 A.2d 1036):
County agency's removal of black foster child
from white foster parents that had cared for her
from July 1990, when she was six months old,
until March 1992, when she was placed with
black family that already had custody of her two
brothers, and agency's recommendation that
black family, rather than white foster family, be
permitted to adopt her, did not violate white
foster parents' due process rights, because foster
parent relationship is creature of statute that has
not been recognized as legally equivalent to either
biological family or adoptive family; foster par-
ents lack third-party standing to assert purported
constitutional violations against foster child, be-
cause prior to time their action was filed, court
had approved adoption decree, thus making her
adoptive parents and her court-designated inde-
pendent counsel definitive guardians of her inter-
ests, and because in any event foster child has no
recognized liberty interest in remaining with spe-
cific foster family; foster parents' claim that they
have standing as taxpayers to challenge agency's
action is meritless; although trial court erred in
dismissing white foster parents' claim that agen-
cy's refusal to place child with them for adoption
violated their equal protection rights, its error
was harmless because, at time it considered agen-
cy's motion to dismiss, injunctive and declaratory Quein prsted fro Doe oal of
relief sought by foster parents had been mooted cn ea ter ci fom whie foe o
by trial court's ruling in black family's adoption by co ntrfysolsies s on
proceedings; agency director was acting as state, bais osrace acon o bet ine o
rather than local, official when he recommended cdnstue volando Foueentend-
child for placement with black family and is mes D oes and/o r rection
therefore immune from liability under 42 USC Clue?()Dsdpatntirco'rfsl1983efor in hi ficl cpaity presented: to consent to adoption of African American foster
can A i ose hild by white foster parents solely on basis of
race constitute violation of Due Process and/or
Equal Protection Clauses? (3) Do white foster
parents, as individuals, taxpayers, and as next
friend of African American foster child, have
constitutionally protected liberty interest in issues
of foster care placement in their home and their
right to adopt foster children in their care under
Due Process Clause? (4) Does African American
foster child have constitutionally protected liberty
interest in issues relative to her foster care place-
ment and/or subsequent adoption under Due Pro-
cess Clause?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/16/95, by Earl
W. Bartgis Jr., Conrad W. Varner, and Miles &
Stockbridge P.C., all of Frederick, Md.
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THE REPUBLICANS SEIZE THE HGH GROUND
ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Thursday, March 9, 1995
By Albert R. Hunt
Here's a twist: House Republicans, under the
aegis of the Contract With America, are coming to the
aid of defenseless little African-American children
while the Clinton administration sits on the sidelines.
The issue is transracial adoption. A bill
sponsored by liberal Democratic Sen. Howard
Metzenbaum last year was supposed to prevent
discrimination in adoption cases because of race. But
Mr. Metzenbaum, now retired, laments that his effort
-- endorsed by President Clinton - was hijacked by
the Department of Health and Human Services,
apparently to placate black social workers who have
long opposed transracial adoption as "racial
genocide."
House Republicans, led by Rep. Jim Bunning of
Kentucky, leapt into the breach and, as part of the big
welfare bill approved by the House Ways and Means
Committee yesterday, would make it illegal for
adoption agencies that get federal funds to
discriminate. Although this would overturn the
legislation that bears his name, Sen. Metzenbaum may
support it.
The whole issue crystallizes larger problems the
Democrats confront with race-based decisions. The
efforts by the Clinton administration's Department of
Health and Human Services to weaken transracial
adoptions raise serious constitutional concerns,
according to the Clinton administration's Justice
Department.
This is precisely what enables critics to depict
affirmative action as race- based special treatment
e t- as an effort to fight pst disrinatio ad
promote diversity. In fact, affirmative action has been
more successful than the current debate suggests.
Few areas, for example, have been more
controversial than integrating police and fire
departments. But it's undeniable that in a lot of cities,
it's safer today for the fire department to go into
certain areas because the trucks aren't manned only by
whites, and that community policing in high crime
areas is more successful because of an influx of
minorities.
The impact on the private sector has been real and
beneficial. A personal example: When I joined this
newspaper almost three decades ago there were
precious few women or minorities on the news staff.
Today about one out of five Journal news staff
employees is a member of a minority group, and about
40% of the staff is female. As recently as 12 years ago
there were no minority reporters in the Washington
bureau and not that many women; today more than
10% of the Washington reporters are minorities and
almost a third are women. Some more-qualified -- on
paper - white males may have been passed over. But
The Wall Street Journal is a far better newspaper
today because of a more diverse staff.
Yet opponents continue the canard about reverse
discrimination, with ludicrous assertions like white
males are an "endangered species." For all the racial
progress we've made in America, can any sensible
person say, with a straight face, that many white males
would trade places with many blacks or women?
But it's also true that some affirmative action has
outlived its usefulness and too often has been turned
into politically destructive quotas. When race- based
considerations become the dispositive factor, it
offends most Americans.
That's the history of transracial adoption for the
past 20 years. Because of the black social workers,
thousands of black children have been disadvantaged:
There are as many as 100,000 children in foster care
today waiting to be adopted, and 40% are
African-American. These black children, on average,
wait twice as long as white children to be adopted.
Howard Metzenbaum's view was simple: When
there are two equally qualified prospective parents,
preference can be given to same-race adoptions, and
where there are special factors - a child who has been
in several foster homes of the same race - racial
factors can be considered. Otherwise, race never
should be used to delay fnding or to den, a baby or
_-.7fl. f t . -A -.. 61Wf~ o. LJ Lflay, a va y UA
a young child caring parents.
But by gutting this legislation in the closing days
of the last Congress, HHS threatens not only to create
lousy social policy but to cause constitutional
problems too. Walter Dellinger, who heads the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel, privately has
expressed "serious concerns" that the transracial
adoption measure may permit race to play a broader
role than is constitutionally allowed.
The courts have consistently held that race-based
governmental decisions are impermissible except in
the context of affirmative action, specifically meaning
they either must redress prior discrimination or
promote integration. Obviously, government
sanctioned, race-based decisions on adoptions
wouldn't qualify.
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Mr. Dellinger has argued that guidelines should
be adopted that very narrowly limit the use of race in
any child-placement decisions. For instance, race
could be considered only in the context of specific
needs for a specific child. But privately HHS is
considering guidelines that would allow delays of up
to a year in order to find a adoptive parent of the same
race. "That would be a cruel abomination and is
totally contrary to what I, and President Clinton,
intended," thunders Mr. Metzenbaum.
Jim Bunning, meanwhile, was not only following
the GOP Contract but reflecting a personal experience
too. His daughter's recent adoption of an
African-American baby was delayed, apparently
because of race-based considerations. He and Mr.
Metzenbaum talked on Tuesday for the first time and
are in basic agreement.
One legitimate concern of some
African-Americans has been that adoption can be so
expensive -- $5,000 to $10,000 is not unusual -- that
it amounts to economic discrimination. But another
part of the GOP Contract promises a $5,000
refundable tax credit for adoption for anyone making
up to $60,000. Although some tax experts worry that
the refundable credit invites fraud -- early indications
suggest ominous levels of fraud in the heralded
earned-income tax credit - Rep. Bunning insists
"we'll keep the refundable part" of that tax break in
subsequent legislation.
The congressional Republican agenda is largely
oblivious to the plight of black children. Moreover, as
the National Council for Adoption complains, the
separate GOP plan to turn foster care and adoption
assistance into block grants to the states inadequately
protects the interests of some -of these innocent
children.
But on the symbolic issue of transracial adoption,
Jim Bunning has put the GOP on the high ground, as
President Clinton is undercut by his own Department
of Health and Human Services.
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94-203 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF 94-1614 WISCONSIN v. NEW YORK, N.Y.
VIRGINIA 1990 cenius-Decision not to adjust numbers for
Voting Rights Act-State nominating conven- undercount of minorities.
tion-Non-waivable fee-Poll tax. Ruling below (City of New York v. U.S. Dept.
Ruling below (DC WDVa, 853 F.Supp. 212): of Commerce, CA 2, 34 F.3d 1114, 63 LW
Selection of delegates to Virginia Republican 2128):
Party's nominating convention through local con- Secretary of commerce's decision not to adjust
ventions, mass meetings, and party canvasses, 1990 census for undercount of minorities violates
rather than through primary election, renders Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
preclearance requirement of Section 5 of Voting unless government can show that undercounting
Rights Act inapplicable to party's requirement minorities is essential for achievement of legiti-
that all persons who wish to become delegates to mate governmental objective.
such convention, called to nominate U.S. Senate Question presented Was decision of secretary
candidate, pay registration fee of $45. of commerce not to substitute statistically adiust-
Questions presented: (1) Does Section 5 of
Voting Rights Act require preclearance of politi-
cal party's decision to hold convention and to
impose non-waivable $45 fee on all voters who
wish to participate in process of nominating par-
ty's candidate for U.S. Senator? (2) Does Section
5 require preclearance of political party's decision
to hold convention and to impose non-waivable
$45 filing fee on all candidates for position of
delegate to state convention called to nominate
that party's candidate for U.S. Senator? (3) Can
individual voters who have been forced to pay
illegal poll tax or who claim to have been deterred
from participating in election by existence of such
tax bring suit under Section 10 of Voting Rights
Act, which explicitly outlaws poll taxes?
Appeal filed 8/1/94, by Pamela S. Karlan and
George A. Rutherglen, both of Charlottesville,
Va., Eben Moglen, of New York, N.Y., and
Daniel R. Ortiz, of Los Angeles, Calif.
ed census numbers for 1990 decennial census
totals previously reported by president for reap-
portionment of Congress and transmitted to
states for use in redistricting consistent with lan-
guage of U.S. Constitution and constitutional
goal of equal representation?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/3/95, by James
E. Doyle, Wis. Atty. Gen., and Peter C. Ander-
son, Asst. Atty. Gen.
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MILITARY POLICY ON GAYS INVALID, U.S. JUDGE RULES
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Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington - A federal judge in New York, accusing
the Clinton administration and Congress of giving in
to "irrational prejudices" against homosexuals, ruled
yesterday that it is unconstitutional to discharge
military service members just for saying they are gay
or lesbian.
The ruling by Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of
Brooklyn against the "don't ask, don't tell" policy was
the first on the constitutionality of the main features of
a compromise worked out in 1993.
The judge's decision struck at the heart of the
policy: a provision that allows homosexuals to remain
in the service - a change from a long-standing former
policy that banned all homosexuals - but allows them
to remain only if they do not admit they are
homosexual or if they can convince their commander
that their admission of homosexuality was wrong.
That provision, Judge Nickerson said, "offers
powerful inducements to homosexuals to lie."
Both gays and nongays in the service, he said,
"would be entitled to think it demeaning and unworthy
of a great nation to base a policy on pretense rather
than on truth."
The decision set in motion a process that could
put the case in the Supreme Court by late this year or
early next year, with a final ruling as early as a year
from now.
First, though, the Justice Department, acting as
the Pentagon's lawyer, indicated it will appeal to a
federal appeals court in New York City.
There have been signs that the appeals court will
act promptly when it gets the constitutional dispute.
As a practical matter, Judge Nickerson's ruling
was not a signal to homosexuals in the military that
they could now disclose their status and be protected.
Although saying the key part of the policy was
invalid, the judge ruled on the claims only of the six
service members who filed the challenge -- a lesbian
Army officer and five gay Army, Navy or Coast Guard
officers or enlisted men.
Military commanders now can take no action
against those six.
Beatrice Dohrn, legal director of a gay rights
advocacy group, the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, commented after the ruling: "We
don't want people to read the paper and think they can
come out tomorrow."
But she, along with other lawyers in the case from
the American Civil Liberties Union, said they would
continue challenging until the policy is finally voided.
Ms. Dohrn said yesterday's ruling was "a decisive
setback" for the policy.
The Justice Department made clear that it, too,
would carry on.
Said department spokesman John K. Russell:
"We believe the challenged policy is constitutional
and remain committed to defending it."
Pentagon public affairs director Kenneth Bacon
told reporters that the ruling did not affect the policy's
continued enforcement against others, and he vowed
that military commanders would continue to enforce it.
If commanders do seek to discharge other
homosexuals who say openly that they are gay or
lesbian, however, their lawyers would seek to rely on
the precedent set by Judge Nickerson, even though it
is not technically binding on anyone but the six.
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy that faltered
yesterday in its first significant courtroom encounter
was put together after President Clinton had
abandoned a campaign pledge to wipe out the
half-centuy-old rules against retaining any
homosexuals in uniform.
The old rules -- leading to tens of thousands of
discharges - had met mixed results in courtroom
challenges until they were discarded in favor of the
new approach.
The new version went into effect 13 months ago.
It is unclear how many homosexuals have been
discharged under the new policy, but a study last
month by the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network
said the rate of homosexual discharges has remained
the same.
Although the new policy completely rewrote
military rules on homosexuality, Judge Nickerson
dealt only with the part that permits the discharge of
homosexuals who say they are gay or lesbian, either
on their own or when asked by commanders acting on
some evidence of homosexuality.
Striking that down, the judge denounced the
policy's main features as Orwellian, Draconian,
Byzantine and extreme.
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He was especially critical of the policy's linkage
of statements about being gay or lesbian with
assumptions that those service members would
commit "undesirable acts."
"Hitler," he wrote, "taught the world what could
happen when the government began to target people
not for what they had done but because of their
status."
The judge also ridiculed the military for claiming
that the policy was needed to protect the privacy of
heterosexuals who would not want to serve alongside
gays.
Service members who are not gay, the judge said,
"are not dunces or ostriches" and will realize that
homosexuals are serving in the ranks because the new
policy allows that.
Heterosexuals, the judge added, will not be
misled into believing that their privacy will be
guarded by a policy that succeeds only in forcing their





Saturday, April 1, 1995
This week a federal judge did
what Bill Clinton and other politicians
should have done two years ago: Stand
unequivocally for the constitutional
rights of gays in the military.
Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the
US District Court in Brooklyn
forthrightly denounced the hypocritical
"don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue"
policy devised by the Clinton
administration as "nothing short of
Orwellian" and ruled that it denied six
gay service members their rights to
free speech and equal protection under
the law. This was the first court test of
the controversial policy, which has
been in effect since February 1994 and
which is expected to reach the US
Supreme Court.
It was refreshing to see Nickerson
strip the veneer from this wretched
political compromise that had been
reached in 1993 to sort-of make good
on a Clinton campaign promise while
trying to appease Pentagon
conservatives. The result was a rule
that allowed homosexuals to serve
their country, and die for it, as long as
they never spoke the truth about their
sexual orientation. Such a policy is
"inherently deceptive," said Nickerson,
and does more to undermine morale
than an open atmosphere ever could.
He said Congress could not "enact
discriminatory legislation because it
desires to insulate heterosexual service
members from statements that might
excite their prejudices." He also
pointed out the evil in equating a
homosexual orientation with
misconduct.
"To presume from a person's
status that he or she will commit
undesirable acts is an extreme
measure," said Nickerson. "Hitler
taught the world what could happen
when the government began to target
people not for what they had done but
because of their status."
We hope Nickerson's ruling is the
beginning of a legal road leading to a
more open-minded military.
Homosexuals have always served in
the armed forces, and served well. It's
past time for everyone to accept that.
Any institution runs better in a climate
where the revelation of a person's
sexual orientation -- or religion or
other private matter - is met with a
resounding "So what?"
167
Lieutenant Colonel Jane ABLE, Petty Officer Robert Heigl, First
Lieutenant Kenneth Osborn, Sergeant Steven Spencer, Lieutenant Richard von
Wohld, and Seaman Werner Zehr, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, in his
official capacity, and Federico F. Pena, Secretary of Transportation, in his
official capacity, Defendants.
880 F.Supp. 968





Plaintiffs, six members of the United States
Armed Services (the Services) who have stated that
they are homosexual, brought this action for an order
(1) declaring invalid under the First and Fifth
Amendments Section 571 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C.
§654 (the Act), concerning a new policy as to
homosexuals, and the directives issued under the Act
(the Directives), and (2) enjoining the government
from enforcing the Act and the Directives.
THE GENESIS OF THE ACT
On January 29, 1993 President Clinton directed
then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to submit a draft
executive order "ending discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in determining who may serve" in
the Services, in a manner "consistent with the high
standards of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion
our Armed Forces must maintain."
On July 19, 1993, Secretary Aspin announced a
new policy as to the service of gay men and lesbians
in the Services, stating that "sexual orientation is
considered a personal and private matter ... and is not
a bar to service entry or continued service unless
manifested by homosexual conduct."
From March through late July 1993 the Armed
Services Committees of the House and Senate held
public hearings on the matter. Secretary Aspin
presented the administration's new policy to the
Senate Armed Services Committee on July 20, 1993.
Both Committees issued reports recommending
legislation practically identical to what is now the Act,
which became effective November 30, 1993. The
Directives became effective February 28, 1994. On
March 15, 1994, the United States Coast Guard
announced its policy on homosexual conduct "in lock
step" with that of the other military services.
THE ACT AND THE DIRECTIVES
Section 654, entitled Policy Concerning
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, contains in
subsection (a) "fifteen findings" that say, among other
things:
(6) Success in combat requires military units that
are characterized by high morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct
is a long-standing element of military law that
continues to be necessary in the unique
circumstances of military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel
policies that exclude persons whose presence in
the ar.ed forces .ould create an unacceptable
risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability.
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons
who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage
in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable
risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the
essence of military capability.
Subsection (b), setting forth the Act's policy,
states, in substance, that a member "shall be
separated" from the Services if one or more of the
following three findings is made:
(1) The member is found to have
engaged, attempted to engage, or solicited another
to engage, in homosexual acts, unless the member
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has demonstrated, among other things, that "such
conduct" departs from the member's usual
behavior and he or she "does not have a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts."
(2) The member "has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual or words to that effect,"
unless "there is a further finding" made in
accordance with regulations that "the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who
engages in, attempts to engage in, has a
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts."
(3) The member has married or attempted to
marry someone of the same sex.
On December 21, 1993 Secretary Aspin issued a
memorandum and Directives concerning the
implementation of the new policy. They provided that
an applicant to become a member will not be asked
about his or her sexual orientation, that "homosexual
orientation is not a bar" to "service entry or continued
service," but that "homosexual conduct" is. Such
"conduct" includes not only homosexual "acts" but
also a statement by a member or applicant that
"demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage" in
such acts. A statement that demonstrates the
"propensity" will thus require separation unless the
member rebuts a presumption that he or she engages
or intends to engage in "homosexual acts" or has a
"propensity" to do so.
The Directives go on to say that "a statement. .
demonstrat[ing] a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because
it reflects the member's sexual orientation, but because
the statement indicates a likelihood that the member
engages in or will engage in homosexual acts."
The Directives do not explain how an
"orientation" meais an "abstract preference" if not
revealed but if admitted becomes evidence of a
"likelihood" to commit acts, a likelihood that requires
discharge.
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
The six plaintiffs have "stated" in their complaint
that they are "homosexuals." That is the only thing
that they have done that is now before the court.
Under the state of the pleadings the court thus does
not consider the case to draw into question the validity
of any subsection of the Act other than (b)(2).
Plaintiffs urge that subsection (b)(2) is invalid
both under the First Amendment and the equal
protection component of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
The Act says that its objective is to reach
"homosexual conduct," that is, "homosexual acts" as
they are defined in the Act. Thus finding (13) in
subsection (a) says that the "prohibition against
homosexual conduct" in the military is "necessary."
Finding (15) indicates that the prohibition against
such conduct is so necessary that even those who have
a mere "propensity" to engage in that conduct must be
discharged from the military because their status as
homosexuals makes it likely that they will commit
homosexual acts.
The statement "I am a homosexual" or "I have a
homosexual propensity" is thus prohibited by the
terms of the Act not because the statement itself
causes harm but because one can infer from it that the
speaker will do harmful things, namely, commit
"homosexual acts" injurious to "morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion."
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The free speech clause of the First Amendment
reads: "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech."
The first question for the court is whether the
government may under the First Amendment prohibit
a member of the Services from stating that he or she is
a homosexual, that is, that he or she has an innate
feeling within that indicates the status of a
homosexual.
Plaintiffs' statements that they are homosexual
constitute "speech," and important, not trivial, speech.
The First Amendment recognizes the value of speech
not only as an instrument, that is, a mechanism by
which ideas may be exchanged, but also as an
expression of personal dignity and integrity. Speech
is worthy of First Amendment protection not only
when it contributes to the "marketplace of ideas" or
assists in the search for "truth," but also when it
articulates "the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests." "Those
who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties.... They valued liberty both as an end and
as a means."
The court recognizes that the judgments of
Congress and the military with regard to military
affairs are entitled to substantial deference, and that
courts "lack the competence" to make policy decisions
in the military context. But that does not mean that
courts are not competent or should abdicate their
responsibility to review the constitutionality of
military decisions. "When Congress' exercise of one
of its enumerated powers clashes with those individual
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is [the
courts'] 'delicate and difficult task' to determine
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whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be
tolerated."
A court need not determine the wisdom of a
particular military policy in order to determine
whether that policy conflicts with the Constitution.
Even in the military context, regulation of speech
based on content survives constitutional scrutiny only
if it is "no more than [what is] reasonably necessary to
protect [a] substantial government interest."
A
Defendants argue that subsection (b)(2) does not
offend the First Amendment because the subsection is
ultimately directed solely at the prohibition of acts and
gives members who reveal their homosexual
"orientation" an opportunity to rebut the presumption
that a member with such an "orientation" will either
commit undesirable acts or has a "propensity" to
commit such acts.
[D]espite its recognition that homosexuals do not
by their nature pose a risk to the military mission or
lack competence as soldiers, the government elected to
allow them to join and remain in the Services only on
the condition that they remain silent regarding their
status. The government justified this condition by
saying that it needed to use a statement of orientation
as evidence of a likelihood to engage in prohibited
acts in order to forestall the commission of such acts.
To presume from a person's status that he or she
will commit undesirable acts is an extreme measure.
Hitler taught the world what could happen when the
government began to target people not for what they
had done but because of their status.
Defendants. . .designed a policy that purportedly
directs discharge based on "conduct," and craftily
sought to avoid the First Amendment by defining
"conduct" to include statements revealing one's
homosexual status. To say "I have a homosexual
orientation," a mere acknowledgment of status, is thus
transmogrified into an admission of misconduct, and
misconduct that the speaker has the practically
insurmountable burden of disproving.
As noted above, the Directives purport to
distinguish between homosexual "orientation" and
homosexual "propensity," defining the former as the
quality of having an "abstract sexual preference for
members of the same sex" and the latter as the quality
of having such a preference that presumably is
sufficiently concrete to indicate a "likelihood" that the
preference will be acted upon.
The court regards the definition and treatment of
these terms to be nothing less than Orwellian.
Although the Act and the Directives are written in
such a manner as to give the impression that there is
a principled distinction between the two
characteristics, only a brief critique will demonstrate
that in practice no such distinction exists.
Thus, the policy treats a statement of homosexual
orientation as proof of the case. Once such a
statement is made, the speaker is judged guilty until
proven innocent of committing misconduct the
government considers so threatening to the military
mission that a member may be discharged for it. This
seems to the court a rather draconian consequence of
merely admitting to an orientation that Congress has
determined to be innocuous.
The plain fact is that subsection (b)(2) burdens
speech based solely on its content by subjecting the
member to a discharge process in which the member
has only at best a hypothetical chance to escape
separation. The Act works to discharge or subject to
discharge proceedings members who possess no more
than an "orientation" regardless of whether they have
engaged in or demonstrated a likelihood of engaging
in prohibited acts, and thus reaches speech that does
not indicate acts.
This court concludes that under the First
Amendment a mere statement of homosexual
orientation is not sufficient proof of intent to commit
acts as to justify the initiation of discharge
proceedings.
B
If there is one thing that is undisputed and seems
self-evident, it is that cohesion depends on mutual
trust within the unit. The honor code for
servicemembers provides that they will not lie or
cheat, and for good reason. Honesty is a quality that
attracts respect. Secrecy and deception invite
suspicion, which in turn erodes trust, the rock on
which cohesion is built.
The policy of the Act is not only inherently
deceptive. It also offers powerful inducements to
homosexuals to lie. An enlisted member may ask
another enlisted member his or her sexual orientation.
It is true that a homosexual may answer "no
comment" But a homosexual who answers truthfully
is subject to discharge proceedings. A heterosexual is
not. The pressure to lie is obvious.
There are no findings, even in the Committee
reports, assessing whether a policy of secrecy and
deception is more or less deleterious to unit cohesion
than would be a policy of openness and honesty. The
court has no findings before it calculating the net
effect of the policy on unit cohesion.
The task of this court is to determine the
constitutionality of the policy adopted by Congress,
not its morality. But heterosexuals and homosexuals
alike would be entitled to think it demeaning and
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unworthy of a great nation to base a policy on pretense
rather than on truth. To invite someone with a
homosexual orientation to join the Services, then to
throw that person out solely because that orientation
is revealed from something he or she said, and finally
to pretend that the discharge was not because of the
person's orientation, might appear to all members,
heterosexual and homosexual, less than honorable,
with incalculable effect on "high morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion."
Even if the First Amendment were to tolerate the
prohibition of a truthful self-identification by a
homosexual because it offends the sensibilities of
some heterosexuals it surely would require a
legislative finding that the consequences of disclosure
would be infinitely more serious than anything
revealed in the record before Congress. Even General
Otjen conceded that the Services would fulfill their
mission if homosexuals were permitted to reveal their
orientation.
In any event the Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment will not countenance the
proscription of the expression of an idea because
others find that idea repugnant.
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
This principle applies with particular force where,
as here, heterosexuals find the mere idea of
homosexual orientation disagreeable based largely on
irrational stereotypes.
The court holds that subsection (b)(2) of the Act
and its accompanying Directives are invalid under the
First Amendment.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
makes binding upon the federal government the
Fourteenth Amendment's command that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
The court analyzes Fifth Amendment equal
protection challenges by the same standards as those
applicable to claims of violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because the Act gives to persons of one status,
heterosexual, the chance to exercise the fundamental
right of free speech and prohibits it to those of another
status, homosexual, defendants must at least show that
the policy is "tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest."
For the reasons discussed above, whether the
government intended that subsection (b)(2) prevent
the commission of prohibited "acts" or appease
heterosexual prejudices, defendants fail to make the
required showing.
Even if defendants do believe that heterosexual
servicemembers will be so upset by a coworker's mere
statement of homosexuality as not to work
cooperatively in the unit, such a belief does not justify
a discriminatory policy.
"Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution
may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the
hypothetical effects of private [ ] prejudice that they
assume to be both widely and deeply held." Congress
may not enact discriminatory legislation because it
desires to insulate heterosexual servicemembers from
statements that might excite their prejudices.
The court holds that subsection (b)(2) of the Act
and its accompanying Directives violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The court declares subsection (b)(2) of the Act,
10 U.S.C. §654(b)(2), and the Directives
implementing that subsection invalid under the First
and Fifth Amendments and enjoins defendants from
enforcing them against plaintiffs.
So ordered.
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